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Sophie's Choices:
Medical and Legal Responses to Suffering
Lois Shepherd*
I. INTRODUCTION
In William Styron's novel Sophie's Choice,1 Sophie Biegafiski Zawistow-
ska enters Auschwitz-Birkenau in 1943 and is given the choice of saving
only one of her two children; the other will be sent to the gas chamber.
The medical doctor in charge of selection requires her to make a decision:
Should she sacrifice her firstborn son, Jan, or his younger sister, Eva? She
is given no time to think. Readers participate in her distress and the impos-
sibility of her situation. Either choice will result in the death of one of her
children. She selects Eva for the chamber.
In this Article I argue that Sophie made the wrong choice.2 Rather
than choose one of her children over the other, Sophie could have re-
jected such a choice altogether.3 I argue further that some trends in
medicine and law concerning suffering are creating situations in which we
might be making the wrong choices, or, as was the case with Sophie, in
which we are accepting the power to make choices that we could refuse to
make. We have the capacity and are morally compelled to resist such
trends.
American society, through its law, is showing a willingness to adopt,
without due reflection, medical responses to suffering,4 and to incorporate
the medical solution to suffering into our ethical and legal norms to the
exclusion of other approaches. The medical response to suffering is to
alleviate individual instances of suffering through medical technology with
insufficient regard for the costs this approach may have to other things of
value, things valued by the individual patient or by us as a community.
Under the developing ethic of this medical culture I would posit that
the phrase "needless suffering," which may once have referred to suffering
that could be avoided (as compared to suffering which could not), has
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1 WILLIAM STYRON, SOPHIE'S CHOICE (1979).
2 See infra notes 237-42 and accompanying text.
3 As readers of Sophie's Choic we, unlike Sophie, have the time, hindsight, and detachment
to make this assessment. The point is not to condemn the character Sophie, but to use her
situation to better understand the implications of such choices.
4 I use the term "suffering" rather than "pain" in this article because it is not merely physical
"hurting" that we seek to avoid, but also the loss of self-control and dignity that may occur even in
the absence of physical pain and that often occurs as a result of medication to relieve pain.
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come to mean all suffering; suffering is needless. In many situations this is
certainly true. Often suffering is readily apparent, the technology is avail-
able to relieve the suffering, and the use of that technology does not im-
pinge upon other individual or community values.
Yet situations remain where medicine cannot provide a cure or effec-
tive palliative care. In these situations, what does the notion that "suffering
is needless" mean?5 Medical diagnosis can often now predict if suffering
will occur and to what degree. Using this information, medical profession-
als can then employ medical technology to avoid or eliminate the suffering
by avoiding or eliminating the life of the one who suffers. This, in a
number of instances, is the "best" that medicine can now offer us with re-
spect to a number of conditions. For example, through amniocentesis,
medical professionals can detect a fetus with a fatal or particularly vicious
genetic disease (such as Tay-Sachs6) and then abort the fetus (a medical
procedure). Likewise, the cancer patient can be diagnosed as terminal 7
within six months or so and then (if legally permitted8 ) seek a prescription
of lethal drugs and "die with dignity," as doctors consider taking on an
expanded role in the process of dying.
We should perhaps expect nothing different from the medical profes-
sion. Relief of suffering is a noble pursuit and an essential part of the pro-
fession's calling.9 The problem is our apparent willingness to concede to
the medical approach without considering what may be lost if that ap-
proach is given unchallenged primacy. The existence of other approaches
from other areas of our society, such as law or public opinion, would tem-
5 This use of the phrase "needless suffering" or "unnecessary suffering" can be seen in Lee v.
Oregon, 891 F. Supp. 1429 (D. Or. 1995), challenging the constitutionality of Oregon's Death with
Dignity Act, which permits physicians to assist terminally ill patients in dying. In that case the
state listed as one of its interests in the Act "avoiding unnecessary pain and suffering." Id. at 1434.
Because the pain and suffering could not (presumably) be alleviated through comfort care, social
support, or other means, it was "unnecessary" only in the sense that it could be alleviated
through termination of life. See infra notes 98-99 and accompanying text.
6 Within the first year of life children with Tay-Sachs disease, who at birth appear "normal,"
"begin to regress and lose contact with their families and environment... declining inexorably
toward a totally vegetative state." MadeleineJ. Goodman & Lenn E. Goodman, The Overselling of
Genetic Anxiety, HASTINGS CTR. REP., October, 1982, at 20. "[M]ental retarda-
tion .... convulsions .... blindness.... gross physical deformit[ies]," and "considerable pain"
characterize the remainder of the child's life. Curlender v. Bio-Science Lab., 165 Cal. Rptr. 477,
480-81 (Ct. App. 1980). The life span of children with Tay-Sachs is two to four years. Goodman
& Goodman, supra; see also William G. Johnson, Lysosomal Diseases and Other Storage Diseases, in
MERRITT'S TEXTBOOK OF NEUROLOGY 547, 550-51 (Lewis P. Rowland ed., 9th ed. 1995).
7 It should be noted that determining a patient's prognosis is "fraught with difficulties and
uncertainties," as evidenced by the fact that physicians commonly refer patients to hospice when
they have only one month to live, rather than the six months that the hospice permits. Ann
Alpers & Bernard Lo, Physician-Assisted Suicide in Oregon: A Bold Experimen4 274 JAMA 483, 484
(1995) (citations omitted); see also DAVID CUNDInl, EuTHANASIA Is NOT THE ANSwFR: A HOSPICE
PI-sicLAN's VIEw 62 (1992). Cundiffarges that determining a patient's diagnosis and prognosis
is often difficult:
Currently, for a cancer patient to elect the Medicare hospice benefit, two physicians
must certify a prognosis of less than six months. A significant proportion of the patients
who elect the Medicare hospice benefit outlive that prediction.
Predicting how long someone may live with cancer is very difficult at best.
Id.
8 See infra notes 90-117 and accompanying text.
9 See Martin S. Pernick, The Calculus of Suffering in Nineteenth-Century Suffering, HASTINGS CTR.
REP., Apr. 1983, at 26.
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per the effect of a purely medical response to suffering. However, such
approaches appear to be losing their ground, particularly in situations at
the edges of life.' 0 With respect to birth, we see attempts (and some suc-
cesses) to fashion a right not to be born where severe genetic anomalies
may be detected in a fetus. At the end of life, we see attempts (and again
some successes) to assert a right to die. In such instances the basis of the
rights espoused is the principle that people should not be required to suf-
fer when the means are available to end or altogether avoid such suffering,
even if such means are ending the life or avoiding the life of the one who
will suffer.
One purpose of this Article is to demonstrate that unprecedented
claims to rights based on the avoidance of suffering are being made and
recognized in courts and legislatures. The basis of such appeals is a belief
that the suffering imposed by nature need not be tolerated and that such
suffering instills in the suffering individual a right to relief." Suffering
thus becomes a sufficient condition for a right. There need be no
tortfeasor nor any societally-caused harm, nor any inequality for a suffering
individual (or such individual's advocate) to claim relief. Oftentimes the
claim is not specifically articulated as having its basis in the right to avoid
suffering, and indeed the claim may masquerade as something else, such as
the claim to autonomy made by advocates of physician-assisted suicide.' 2
Why do we see this trend and what are its implications? I believe the
combination of two developments explains the emergence of claims to
rights based in suffering: first, our increasing acceptance and expectation of
technology-based solutions to human problems, and second, the develop-
ment of a collective conscience-a community empathy for other individu-
als-in matters of personal well-being.
The implications are potentially far-reaching. Although the alleviation
of suffering has been for some time an aspiration in human rights pro-
nouncements,' 3 in the United States our jurisprudence has given little def-
10 Ronald Dworkin uses this phrase in his discussion of abortion and euthanasia in his recent
book, Life's Dominion. RONALD DwORmIN, LiFE's DOMINION (1993).
11 The developing right to avoid suffering is best understood as a Hohfeldian "claim-right,"
Wesley N. Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasonin& 23 YALE Lj. 16,
36-38 (1913), which may indicate a duty on behalf of others to either "let P do X" in the sense of a
purely negative duty, or to "do what one can to make it possible for P to do X." Jeremy Waldron,
Introduction, in THEORIFS OF RiGHTs 6 (Jeremy Waldron ed., 1984). According to my thesis, the
right to avoid suffering is not merely a right to be let alone and instead entails duties of affirma-
tive action on the part of others; the stronger the right becomes, the more the corresponding
duties will require affirmative action. Thus, the right not to be born, see infra notes 22-72 and
accompanying text, requires that physicians predict and evaluate the risk and degree of suffering
of children yet to be born and requires that prospective parents act on that information to avoid
the suffering of children. The right to die, see infra notes 73-131 and accompanying text, requires
that physicians assess the degree of suffering that a patient is experiencing or will experience and
prescribe the relief sought if that suffering is adequately severe. See Bouvia v. Superior Court, 225
Cal. Rptr. 297 (Ct. App. 1986), discussed infra notes 118-27 and accompanying text. Although
the right to physician-assisted suicide may not require physicians to give patients a lethal prescrip-
tion of drugs, the right does require that the state alter its traditional understanding of the medi-
cal profession to permit physicians to perform such services.
12 See infra notes 90-117 and accompanying text.
13 See Thomas D. Jones, A Human Rights Tragedy: The Cuban and Haitian Refugee Crises Revis-
ited, 9 GEO IMMIGR. LJ. 479, 484-85 (1995) (asserting that "[u]pholding universal human rights
promotes the common good of mankind. By championing the human rights of refugees to 'seek
1996]
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erence to such appeals. 14 One recent court of appeals decision reads,
"[c]ompassion cannot be the compass of a federal judge. That compass is
the Constitution of the United States."' 5 The bulwarks of individual rights
under the Constitution are generally rights to freedom from the interfer-
ence of others (liberty) and rights to equal treatment (equality). In medi-
cal ethics, these principles translate into autonomy and the Kantian notion
of equal respect for persons. Both of these are potentially threatened by
rights based in suffering. Recognizing these rights requires that we make
decisions about other people's suffering, their quality of life, and therefore
their value in living. Once we decide that the suffering is sufficiently severe
and the quality of life substantially diminished, then we are justified in
treating the individual sufferer differently; we are justified in making deci-
sions that erode autonomy and equality in the name of providing required
relief from suffering.
We must be concerned that we will create our own Sophie's choices
where they do not now exist, that we will perceive ourselves as being in
situations in which medical ethics compel us to choose between one
human life and another, when we are fundamentally entitled to refuse to recognize
and make such choices. Thus, like Sophie, we will make the wrong choice in
allowing societal dictum (as she allowed the doctor in charge of selection at
Auschwitz-Birkenau) to compel us to choose one human life over another.
Indeed, the recent opinion of the Council on Ethical and Judicial Af-
fairs of the American Medical Association regarding the use of
anencephalic infants as organ donors is indicative of developments on the
horizon.1 6 Anencephalic infants are born with a functioning brain stem,
and therefore do not meet our current standards for determining that
death has occurred, but they permanently lack all cognitive function be-
cause the rest of the brain has failed to develop.' 7 Currently anencephalic
infants cannot be used as organ donors because we insist that donors be
dead prior to the removal of vital organs.' 8 The Council Report proposes
an exception to this rule, and while the proposal has been "temporarily
suspended" in order to allow time for more research into the condition of
anencephaly,' 9 its fundamental willingness to choose the life of one per-
and enjoy' asylum, we 'alleviate [their] suffering' and reinforce[ ] this nation's own cohesion, its
moral purpose and its appreciation of its own domestic liberties." (quotingJerome Shestack, An
Unsteady Focus: The Vulnerabilities of the Reagan Administration's Human Rights Policy, 2 HARv. HUM.
Rrs. Y.B. 25, 49-50 (1989))); MichaelJ. Mattler, Note, The Distinction Between Civil Wars and Inter-
national Wars and its Legal Implications, 26 N.Y.U.J. INr'L L. & POL. 655, 658 (1994) (asserting that
.actors such as the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and the United Nations
High Commissioner for Human Rights have emerged in response to the international commu-
nity's desire to alleviate all forms of human suffering, regardless of their sources").
14 See infra note 225 and accompanying text.
15 Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 49 F.3d 586, 594 (9th Cir. 1995) (Noonan,J.) (hold-
ing Washington ban on physician-assisted suicide does not deprive persons of constitutionally
protected liberty interest), rev'd en banc, 79 F.3d 790 (9th Cir.), cert. granted sub nom. Washington v.
Glucksberg, 65 U.S.L.W. 3085 (U.S. Oct. 1, 1996). See infta notes 101-17 and accompanying text
16 Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, American Medical Association, The Use of
Anencephalic Neonates as Organ Donors, 273 JAMA 1614 (1995) [hereinafter Council Report].
17 Id. at 1615. See infra notes 252-78 and accompanying text.
18 See UNIF. ANATOMICAL Gir Acr (1987) §§ 1-3, 8A U.L.A. 29 (1993) (stating that an ana-
tomical gift takes effect upon or after death).
19 See infra note 260 and accompanying text.
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son20 over another has not been retracted. The proposal evidences our
increasing willingness to seek medical solutions to the difficult issues of life
ethics and our readiness to ascribe rights based on relief or avoidance of
suffering. The direction the Council Report points, I will argue, is toward
Sophie's Choices of our own making.2'
In Section II of this Article I will explore the emergence of rights
based upon the principle that individuals should not be allowed to suffer
when the means are available to end or avoid altogether their suffering.
This development is explored at both edges of life: in the practices and
legal environment of genetic screening to prevent the births of children
with genetic anomalies (the right not to be born), and in the debate over
decisions to end the life of a person in ill health, either through physician-
assisted suicide or the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment (the right to
die). In Section III, I discuss the reasons for this development. In Section
IV, I attempt to place the emergence of the principle of suffering-based
rights in the context of other grounds for rights and discuss the broader
implications of our recognition of suffering-based rights.
II. RIGHTS BASED IN SUFFERING
A. The Right Not to Be Born
There is a growing view that some lives are not worth living at all; that
for some people, it may be better never to have been born than to have
been born with the genetic legacy assigned them by nature.22 Because
most genetic traits considered disorders or diseases are not currently treata-
ble, the very purpose of most prenatal testing is to determine whether the
prospective mother should abort a fetus.23 If, because of the negligence of
medical care providers, a pregnant woman is given an inadequate opportu-
nity to abort the fetus with detectable genetic anomalies, the parents of the
child may pursue a wrongful birth claim against the providers. Further, in
some jurisdictions, the child herself may have a wrongful life claim against
the same defendants. As discussed more fully below, in both the wrongful
birth and wrongful life suits the plaintiffs must prove that had the prospec-
tive mother been aware of the potential disabilities of the child, she would
have chosen to abort the fetus. The essence of the child's claim in wrong-
ful life suits is that the child would have been better off had she not been
born; her suffering in life is worse than no life at all.24
20 See infra note 271 (discussing whether the infant with anencephaly is a person).
21 Cf GuIDO CAIABRESI & PHLuP BOBBrrr, TRAGIC CHOICES (1978) (discussing the ap-
proaches we use to allocate tragically scarce resources).
22 See Lois Shepherd, Protecting Parents'Freedom to Have Children with CenetikDifferences, 1995 U.
IL L. REv. 761, 769-84 (1995).
23 See, e.g., Gildiner v. Thomas Jefferson Univ. Hosp., 451 F. Supp. 692, 695 (E.D. Pa. 1978)
("The value of genetic testing programs ... is based on the opportunity of parents to abort
afflicted fetuses, within appropriate time limitations.").
24 In Gleitman v. Cosgrvae one of the first cases addressing wrongful life and wrongful birth
torts (rejecting both), ChiefJustice Weintraub, in concurring on the issue that the child did not
present a claim upon which relief could be granted, stated:
Ultimately, the infant's complaint is that he would be better off not to have been
born .... We must remember that the choice is not between being born with health or
19961
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Can the wrongful life suit, to the extent it is recognized, be brought by
the child against the parent(s)? If third parties can be found liable under
wrongful life suits for negligence, can parents' prenatal choices also be
considered negligent? Consistent with the child's right against negligent
third parties is the potential legal claim the child may have against the
mother who chose not to abort. Again, the child's claim is that the extent
of her suffering in life, as predicted by prenatal testing or other means, is
worse than never having been born. Instead of designating a third party
medical provider as the tortfeasor, however, the mother's failure to obtain
an abortion when one was legally available to her is the proximate cause of
the child's life of suffering.2 5 The recognition of such a claim has been
rejected in at least one case2 6 and also by state statute. 27 As discussed later
in this Section, however, the possibility of legal recognition of such a claim
is neither fanciful nor without its supporters.2 8 Even absent legal recogni-
tion of such a claim against the mother, prospective parents face growing
medical, economic, and moral pressure to avoid the births of such chil-
dren, primarily because of the extent of suffering that birth will entail. Pro-
spective parents may feel an ethical or moral duty not to continue such
pregnancies, to follow the medically indicated and prescribed solution
rather than rely upon their own autonomous ethical and moral capacities.
The emerging notion that a child has a right to be born healthy--a right
essentially based in suffering-requires parents to adopt a medical re-
sponse to predicted suffering which excludes other equally caring
responses.
1. Wrongful Life Claims against Third-Party Tortfeasors
When a medical care provider fails to inform a pregnant woman of a
prenatal test appropriate for her condition (be it age or family history of a
being born without it; it is not claimed that the defendants failed to do something to
prevent or reduce the ravages of rubella. Rather the choice is between a worldly exist-
ence and none at all.
227 A.2d 689, 711 (N.J. 1967) (Weintraub,J., concurring). Gleitman was overruled on the issue of
wrongful birth in Berman v. Allan, 404 A.2d 8, 14 (N.J. 1979).
25 See Margery W. Shaw, Conditional Prospective Rights of the Fetus, 5 J. LEGAL MED. 63, 110-11
(1984) (suggesting that, unlike physicians, parents do cause a child's impairments when they
knowingly pass along deleterious genes or when the mother fails to abort knowing of fetal
impairments).
26 Elliott v. Brown, 361 So. 2d 546, 548 (Ala. 1978) (refusing to recognize wrongful life cause
of action against a physician partly out of fear that allowing such action would mean women
could be found liable for proceeding with pregnancy knowledgeable of probable fetal
impairments).
27 See CAL. Civ. CODE § 43.6(a) (West 1982) (explicitly granting parents immunity from suits
by children based upon claim that the child "should not have been conceived or, if conceived,
should not have been allowed to have been born alive").
28 See infra notes 68-70 and accompanying text; see a/soJohn A. Robertson, Procreative Liberty
and the Control of Conception, Pregnancy, and Childbirth, 69 VA. L. REv. 405, 437-38 (1983) (arguing
that once a woman has exercised her right to procreate by conceiving, and "waived her right not
to procreate by failing to abort the fetus prior to viability .... she assumes obligations to the fetus
that limit her freedom over her body"; a woman who has failed to abort a nonviable fetus then
has a "legal and moral duty to bring the child into the world as healthy as is reasonably possible");
Shaw, supra note 25, at 93 (supporting the recognition of a legal duty on the part of parents "not
to conceive under certain circumstances," and arguing on behalf of a child's right to "allege that
his or her parents had the duty not to conceive at all," and must therefore be held legally respon-
sible to the child "for causing misery, pain, suffering, and death if it could have been avoided").
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particular disorder),29 or fails to diagnose the hereditary ailment of an-
other sibling in order for the parents to avoid conception,30 or simply
makes a mistake in interpreting or communicating the results of carrier
screening or prenatal tests,3 ' prospective parents do not have the informa-
tion necessary to make a decision whether to conceive or, if conception has
already taken place, whether to abort. As a result, a number of jurisdic-
tions recognize the resulting parents' cause of action for wrongful birth.32
Without the recognition of wrongful birth suits, the law might provide no
deterrent to the negligence of medical care providers in carrier screening,
prenatal testing and counseling regarding such matters. 33
While the wrongful birth suit provides recovery for the parents' in-
jury,3 4 it does not address the suffering of the child. 35 The wrongful life suit
is brought by the child against the health care providers who negligently
took away from the child's mother the opportunity to abort by failing ade-
quately to advise about or competently to perform indicated carrier screen-
ing or prenatal testing. At least three jurisdictions have recognized the
29 See, e.g., Becker v. Schwartz, 386 N.E.2d 807 (N.Y. 1978) (plaintiffs allege that the defend-
ants never advised them of increased risk of Down's Syndrome in children born to women over
35 years of age or of availability of amniocentesis test).
30 See, e.g., Turpin v. Sortini, 643 P.2d 954 (Cal. 1982) (permitting wrongful birth and wrong-
ful life suits where doctors failed to diagnose the hereditary deafness of the child's sister).
31 See, e.g., Curlender v. Bio-Science Lab., 165 Cal. Rptr. 477 (Ct. App. 1980) (alleging that
parents were given "incorrect and inaccurate" information concerning test results for carrier sta-
tus for Tay-Sachs disease).
32 Wrongful birth suits are now widely recognized. See generally Lori B. Andrews, Torts and the
Double Helix: Malpractice Liability for Failure to Warn of Genetic Risks, 29 Hous. L. REv. 149 (1992);
Gregory G. Sarno, Annotation, Tort Liabiliy for Wrongfully Causing One to Be Born, 83 A.L.R3d 15
(1978). But see Atlanta Obstetrics & Gynecology Group v. Abelson, 398 S.E.2d 557, 560 (Ga.
1990) (refusing to recognize "wrongful birth" actions in Georgia absent clear mandate for such
recognition from legislature).
33 Gildiner v. Thomas Jefferson Univ. Hosp., 451 F. Supp. 692, 696 (E.D. Pa. 1978) ("The
recognition of a cause of action for negligence in the performance of genetic testing would en-
courage the accurate performance of such testing by penalizing physicians who fail to observe
customary standards of good medical practice."); Berman v. Allan, 404 A.2d 8, 14 (N.J. 1979)
(ruling otherwise "would in effect immunize from liability those in the medical field providing
inadequate guidance").
34 In wrongful birth suits, the permissible award of damages varies. Some jurisdictions per-
mit recovery of the extraordinary expenses necessary to raise the child, see, e.g., Siemieniec v.
Lutheran Gen. Hosp., 512 N.E.2d 691 (Ill. 1987), some permit recovery for only emotional dis-
tress damages to the parents, see, e.g., Berman v. Allan, 404 A.2d 8, 14 (NJ. 1979), and some
jurisdictions permit recovery of both, see, e.g., Harbeson v. Parke Davis, Inc., 656 P.2d 483, 493
(Wash. 1983).
35 While recovery under the parents' cause of action may provide the additional resources
necessary to care for the child with a disabling condition that could have been detected and
avoided (through abortion), damages awarded will generally only cover the life of the child to its
majority. At this time the parents may under state law no longer be responsible for providing
care for the child. Disability may extend the parents' responsibility for their children's needs
beyond minority, but the prediction of such continued disability and its degree of severity must
be made years earlier at the time of the parents' wrongful birth suit. The Supreme Court of
California explained that, under state law, "the parents' ability to recover those medical expenses
which are reasonably likely to be incurred after the age of majority may depend on whether-at
the time of trial-it can be determined if the child will be able to 'maintain himself by work' on
reaching adulthood." Turpin, 643 P.2d at 965 n.12. Furthermore, absent recognition of wrongful
life actions, "the afflicted child's receipt of necessary medical expenses might well depend on the
wholly fortuitous circumstance of whether the parents are available to sue and recover such dam-
ages." Id. at 965.
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wrongful life cause of action.3 6 Many more have denied its availability to
persons born with disabilities that could have been detected in utero be-
cause of the philosophical implications of such a cause of action.3 7 In de-
nying wrongful life suits, courts have cited problems with two primary
issues, those of injury and damages.
On the issue of injury, the child must allege that had the health care
provider not been negligent, her mother, or parents, would have received
adequate information to make a decision regarding abortion, and would
have aborted. Thus, the child's injury is in being born, not in being born
with disabilities. 38 Because no life was possible without such disabilities, the
traits from which the child now suffers were unavoidable, unless avoided by
avoiding birth itself. To conclude that the plaintiff child had suffered an
injury cognizable in tort, the factfinder would have to compare the relative
benefits of nonexistence to a life with disabilities, a task courts have la-
belled "impossible," 39 involving "a mystery more properly to be left to the
philosophers and the theologians," 4° and "hing[ing] upon subjective and
intensely personal notions as to the intangible value of life."'41
The question of damages is no less troubling. The compensatory mea-
sure of damages required by tort actions would theoretically require a de-
termination of the value of life with disabilities versus the value of no life at
all. Many courts have refused to make such calculations of injury and the
resulting valuations of life with and without disabilities and thus have de-
nied the. availability of wrongful life suits to child plaintiffs.42
But other courts have not been so troubled and have permitted ac-
tions based upon the allegations of the child that she had a "right to be
born as a whole, functional human being."43 Such a right has its origins in
early prenatal tort cases in which courts recognized a duty of care on behalf
of third parties toward the fetus who would later be born with an injury
caused by negligent conduct prior to birth. While prenatal torts require
36 See generally Turpin, 643 P.2d 954; Curlender, 165 Cal. Rptr. 477; Procanik v. Cillo, 478 A.2d
755 (N.J. 1984); Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 656 P.2d 483 (Wash. 1983), aftd, 746 F.2d 517
(9th Cir. 1984). But seeAnthonyJackson, Action for Wrongful Life, Wrongfid Pregnancy, and Wrongful
Birth in the United States and England, 17 Lov. LA. Irr'L & COMP. LJ. 535, 612-13 (1995) (arguing
against recognition of wrongful birth actions and for recognition of wrongful life actions; the
former suits are "highly denigrating to [the] child and to the handicapped population in gen-
eral," whereas the latter allows compensation to the child whose suffering outweighs the benefits
of life).
37 See, e.g., Siemienie4 512 N.E.2d at 696-702 and cases cited therein; see also Lininger v.
Eisenbaum, 764 P.2d 1202 (Colo. 1988); Smith v. Cote, 513 A.2d 341 (N.H. 1986); Elliot v.
Brown, 361 So. 2d 546 (Ala. 1978).
38 See, e.g., Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 227 A.2d 689, 692 (N.J. 1967).
39 Nelson v. Krusen, 678 S.W.2d 918, 925 (Tex. 1984); Smith, 513 A.2d at 352.
40 Becker v. Schwartz, 386 N.E.2d 807, 812 (N.Y. 1978).
41 Smith, 513 A.2d at 353.
42 See, e.g., Elliott, 361 So. 2d at 547 ("The infant plaintiff would have us measure the differ-
ence between his life with defects against the utter void of nonexistence, but it is impossible to
make such a determination.") (quoting Gleitman, 227 A.2d at 692).
43 See, e.g., Turpin v. Sortini, 643 P.2d 954, 956 (Cal. 1982) (child seeking damages for being
"deprived of the fundamental right of a child to be born as a whole, functional human being
without total deafness."). See generally Elizabeth Collins, An Overview and Analysis: Prenatal Torts,
Preconception Torts, Wrongful Life, Wrongful Death, and Wrongful Birth: Timefor a New Framework, 22J.
FAM. L. 677, 706-07 (1984) (advocating recognition of the "right... to be born a whole, function-
ing human being").
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redress-for example, the child who suffers injury as a fetus during a car
accident caused by a negligent driver-the language that has been used to
justify recovery, the language of rights, lays the theoretical groundwork for
rights based on the suffering of an individual that has not been caused by a
tortfeasor. In the cases involving redress for torts suffered prenatally,
courts have declared that children have a right to be born with sound mind
and body.44 What the courts were trying to justify was simply the child's
right to have been free from harmful bodily interference from third parties
while in utero. But the courts needed to avoid saying that fetuses had rights,
since the injury complained of, and now suffered by the child born alive,
may have occurred at a time and under conditions when the mother may
have legally terminated the life of the fetus through abortion. In order to
avoid saying that fetuses have rights to freedom from bodily interference,
the courts used the more positive language of a right "to begin life with a
sound mind and body,"45 which vests in the child later born alive, not in
the fetus at all. There are other ways courts might have gotten around this
problem. For example, the tort might have been seen as committed
against the mother,46 as in a wrongful birth suit, and damages adequate to
cover the child's extra life expenses stemming from the injury could have
been awarded through the mother's cause of action. This seems especially
reasonable in the case of negligent prenatal screening since it was the
mother who engaged the services of the physician in prenatal care.
Instead of choosing this course, however, courts recognizing prenatal
torts selected the dangerously expansive, positive language of rights to a
sound mind and body. With this characterization, the prenatal tort ap-
pears based upon a right to have reasonably avoidable suffering avoided.
The wrongful life suit is a form of that right. While attempting to deny
44 See, e.g., Smith v. Brennan, 157 A.2d 497, 503 (NJ. 1960) (holding that infant child was
entitled to recover for prenatal injury because "justice requires ... that a child has a legal right to
begin life with a sound mind and body"); Womack v. Buckhorn, 187 N.W.2d 218 (Mich. 1971)
(holding that a child may recover for damages for harm caused by wrongful conduct that inter-
feres with a child's "legal right to begin life with a sound mind and body") (quoting Smith, 157
A.2d at 503). For an example of the use of this language of rights to scrutinize prenatal conduct
on the part of the pregnant woman, see In re Baby X, 293 N.W.2d 736, 739 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980)
(In case involving prenatal maternal drug addiction, the court states that "[s]ince a child has a
legal right to begin life with a sound mind and body ... we believe it is within this best interest to
examine all prenatal conduct bearing on that right." (emphasis added)).
45 See Smith, 157 A.2d at 503. In Womack v. Buckhorn, the Michigan Supreme Court held that
an eight year old child could sue for injuries suffered in an automobile accident when he was a
four month old fetus:
[A] child has a legal right to begin life with a sound mind and body. If the wrongful
conduct of another interferes with that right, and it can be established by competent
proof that there is a causal connection between the wrongful interference and the harm
suffered by the child when born, damages for such harm should be recoverable by the
child.
Womack v. Buckhorn, 187 N.W.2d at 219, 222 (Mich. 1971) (quoting Smith, 157 A.2d 497 at 503).
46 See Dawn E.Johnsen, Note, The Creation of Fetal Rights: Conflicts with Women's Constitutional
Rights to Liberty, Privay, and Equal Protection, 95 YALE L.J. 599, 611 (1986) ("In their attempt to
protect pregnant women from violent criminal or tortious acts .... lawmakers should structure
the laws so that they retain their focus on the primary subject of protection-the pregnant
woman.").
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this,47 courts recognizing the wrongful life suit choose essentially to credit
the plaintiffs' claims that their suffering is so grave as to exceed the benefits
of life. 48 Because the suffering of many of these children could only have
been avoided by avoiding their births, the "right to sound mind and body"
becomes a "right not to be born," and we begin to look to parents to avoid
the children's suffering through prenatal testing and abortion.
2. Restrictions on Parental Choices
The very purpose of prenatal testing at this stage in medical science is
to permit pregnant women to abort fetuses with genetic anomalies.49 This
decision has generally been considered one for the mother to make with-
out interference. Thus, early attempts by amniocentesis laboratories to
make availability of the technology contingent upon the pregnant woman's
agreement beforehand that she would abort the fetus if the suspected
anomaly were detected, were criticized, and apparently abandoned.50 Like-
wise, suggestions that health maintenance organizations may be currently
engaging in similar coercive methods are met with disbelief and protest.5 '
In the same vein, genetic counseling as a profession has long embraced
ethics that encourage women, or parents jointly, to make their own deci-
sions, and the genetic counselor to remain neutral.52
The appropriateness of neutrality in genetic counseling has, however,
come under recent attack.53 Also, genetic counseling may never have been
neutral in practice, even though counselors not only subscribed to an ethic
of neutrality but honestly sought to follow it. 54 One scholar, Barbara Katz
Rothman, offers a number of examples of counselling interviews con-
ducted by genetic counselors that reveal their biases toward abortion when
the perceived genetic anomaly may be severe, and their biases in the other
47 Curlender v. Bio-Science Lab., 165 Cal. Rptr. 477, 489 (Ct. App. 1980) ("[W]e reject the
notion that a 'wrongful-life' cause of action involves any attempted evaluation of a claimed right
not to be born.").
48 Damages, however, have been limited by these courts to special damages, that amount
necessary to cover the extraordinary expenses such children will face in their lifetime because of
their disability. They refuse to grant general damages on the theory that to do so would involve a
determination of the extent to which nonlife was preferable to the life of the child with disabili-
ties. See, e.g., Turpin v. Sortini, 643 P.2d 954 (Cal. 1982).
49 See supra text accompanying note 23. Arthur Caplan points out that California's mandate
that physicians offer alpha-fetoprotein screening to all pregnant woman is done "in the hope that
some of those who are found to have children with neural tube defects will choose not to bring
them to term; thereby, preventing the state from having to bear the burden of their care." Ar-
thur L. Caplan, Neutrality is Not Morality: The Ethics of Genetic Counseling, in PRESCRIBING OUR FU-
TURE: ETHICAL CHALLENGES IN GENETIC COUNSELING 149, 158-59 (Dianne M. Bartels et al. eds.,
1993).
50 Mark I. Evans et al., Prenatal Diagnosis of Chromosomal and Mendelian Disorders in FETAL DiAG-
NOSIS AND THERAPY. SCIENCE, ETHICS AND THE LAW 41 (Mark I. Evans et al. eds., 1989).
51 David T. Morris, Cost Containment and Reproductive Autonomy: Prenatal Genetic Screening and
the American Health Security Act of 1993, 20 AM. J.L. & MED. 295, 308 (1994).
52 See generallyJames R. Sorenson, Genetic Counseling: Values that Have Mattered, in PRESCRIBING
OUR FUTURE: ETHICAL CHALLENGES IN GENETIC COUNSELING, supra note 49, at 3.
53 See Caplan, supra note 49 at 149 (challenging idea that genetic counseling is value neutral
in practice and also suggesting that it is time for genetic counselors to abandon "the ethic of
neutrality").
54 BARBARA KATz RoTHMAN, THE TENTATrVE PREGNANCY. PRENATAL DIAGNOSIS AND THE Fu-
TURE OF MOTHERHOOD 40-48 (1986).
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direction when the genetic difference is thought to be only slight 55 Biases
toward aborting fetuses that will have significant genetic differences are
also apparent in the preference of many genetic counselors that prospec-
tive parents not face the abortion decision until after the amniocentesis.
As Rothman points out, the decision not to abort is more difficult once
parents are faced with actual knowledge of the fetus' potential difficul-
ties.56 Elias and Annas, writers of some authority in this field, recognize
that parents will be subjected to pressure to abort once the amniocentesis
has revealed a serious genetic anomaly.57
The "seriousness" of any genetic anomaly is largely determined by the
judgments of medical professionals. Usually seeing only those persons with
disabilities who are having medical problems, such professionals' percep-
tions about the quality of life of persons with disabilities may be excessively
negative.58 The medical profession also appears to have a more conserva-
tive perception of what is an acceptable degree of risk59 than the lay com-
munity has, and those perceptions appear to be growing even more
conservative. Since the introduction of prenatal testing, genetic counselors
have undergone a substantial change of heart about what odds are high
risks and what odds are low risks.60 In Rothman's study of genetic counsel-
55 Id.
56 Id. at 44. Parents may be forced to obtain knowledge as to whether or not their offspring
carries a "congenital defect" because, as Robertson argues, once a woman chooses to conceive
and carry the child to term, certain obligations attach, including a duty to undergo prenatal
testing "where there is a reason to believe that this screening may identify congenital defects
correctable with available therapies." Robertson, supra note 28, at 450.
57 Sherman Elias & George J. Annas, Generic Consent for Genetic Screening 30 NEw ENG. J.
MED. 1611, 1612 (1994) (recognizing that such pressure will be imposed, and emphasizing that
the abortion question should be discussed prior to prenatal testing).
58 Marsha Saxton, Prenatal Screening and Discriminatory Attitudes About Disability, 13 WOMEN &
HEALTH 217, 223 (1988) ("By working in hospitals, with sick people, doctors generally see only
those cases of disability where there are complications, where patients are poorly managed, or
patients in terminal stages. Many physicians never have the opportunity to see disabled individu-
als living independently, productively, enjoyably.").
59 Often, prenatal testing can result only in a finding of probability of a particular condition,
rather than outright discovery of it. For example, in members of the same family, different genes
found on different chromosomes can independently result in identical clinical symptoms, as oc-
curs in the inherited form of blindness, retinitis pigmentosa. In addition, a single gene may have
the potential to undergo hundreds of different mutations, all resulting in one type of disease, and
it is difficult to test for every possible mutation. Further, some mutations may be expressed clini-
cally in certain people, and silent in others, or if the mutation does present itself clinically, the
condition may vary widely in symptomatology or severity. CoMrITTE ON ASSESSING GENErIC
RISKS, DIVISION OF HEALTH SCIENCES POLICY, INsTrruTE OF MEDICINE, ASSESSING GENETIC RISKS:
IMPLICATIONS FOR HEALTH AND SOCIAL POuCY 62 (Lori B. Andrews et al. eds., 1994). The Com-
mittee on Assessing Genetic Risks (Committee) notes that:
Many diseases do not manifest clinically until adulthood and may become apparent
only in middle age or later. Predictive or presymptomatic testing and screening can provide
clues to which people may later develop one or more of these disorders. Often such
tests will give information regarding a genetic susceptibility or predisposition, rather
than providing definitive prediction.
Id. at 86. The Committee also notes that many diseases are multi-factorial in causation, meaning
that environmental factors may interact with one family's set of genes but not with another's.
Additionally, the various genes themselves may interact with each other, and this "multiple gene
action" is impossible to predict using a separate analysis of each single gene. "In such cases,
definitive predictions will rarely, if ever, be possible, and it will be impossible to group individuals
into two distinct categories-those at no (or very low) risk and those at high risk." Id. (citations
omitted).
60 ROTHMAN, supra note 54, at 43-44.
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ing, twice as many counselors in 1983 as in 1973 called a risk of one-in-100
"high" or "very high,"61 and one-fourth did not consider a risk of one-in-
400 to be low. 62 By contrast, one study of women's attitudes toward abor-
tion of fetuses with neural tube defects revealed a sharp increase in the
number of women who said they would abort a fetus when the probability
of the fetus being affected with a neural tube defect rose from 95% to
100%, causing the researchers to conclude that "although 95 per cent accu-
racy in diagnosis is very acceptable to many professionals, to parents, the
psychological difference between any chance and certainty may be tremen-
dous and may make the difference between deciding to abort the fetus or
to bear the child."63
In addition, whether counselors characterize a potential disability to
be a high risk or a low risk depends substantially upon their assessment of
the severity of the disability; the possibility of the presence of Tay-Sachs, for
example, would be considered a "high risk" at lower actual percentages of
probability of occurrence than a less debilitating condition.64 Rothman re-
ports one genetic counselor as explaining that one-in-a-million is a high
risk for Tay-Sachs.65 Thus, the assessment prospective parents receive from
genetic counselors and physicians regarding the extent of risk for a condi-
tion reflects not only statistical probabilities but also the professional coun-
selor's feelings about certain conditions.
Alongside an increasing willingness to exert pressure on women to
abort fetuses with detectable genetic anomalies stands legal precedent that
makes possible the recognition of a cause of action in tort by a child against
a parent for having been born. In the 1980 California case of Curlender v.
Bioscience Laboratories, the California Appeals Court stated that there was no
reason why suit could not be brought against parents who proceeded with
the pregnancy of a fetus they knew to be carrying a "genetic defect."66
Although the legislature of California passed a statute prohibiting such law-
suits, 67 the California court was not as far afield of legal precedent as some
may think.68 While as a practical matter prenatal injury cases still appear
mainly to involve a traditional tort actor (such as the third party who negli-
gently crashes into the car of a pregnant woman), such recovery is permit-
ted from the party whose "wrongful conduct" "interferes" with the child's
"legal right to begin life with a sound mind and body."69 While initially
61 Id. at 43.
62 Id.
63 Ruth R Faden et al., Prenatal Screening and Pregnant Women's Attitudes Toward the Abortion of
Defective Fetuses, 77 Am. J. PUB. HEALTH, 288, 289-90 (1987).
64 ROTHMAN, supra note 54, at 43-44.
65 Id.
66 165 Cal. Rptr. 477, 488 (Ct. App. 1980) ("Under such circumstances, we see no sound
public policy which should protect those parents from being answerable for the pain, suffering
and misery which they have wrought upon their offspring.").
67 CAL. Crv. CODE § 43.6(a) (West 1982).
68 George Schedler, Women's Reproductive Rights: Is There a Conflict with a Child's Right to Be
Born fteeFromDefects? 7J. LEGAL MED. 357,366 (1986) ("It seems logically odd, if not inconsistent,
to claim that the physician's failure to inform the mother causes the fetus's defective birth and
thereby wrongs the fetus, when the mother would have done no legal wrong to the fetus had she
brought it to term knowing it was defective.").
69 Womack v. Buckhorn, 187 N.W.2d 218, 222 (Mich. 1971).
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such wrongful conduct came from traditional third parties, recently courts
have shown a willingness to find the pregnant woman herself to blame,
making her potentially liable under criminal or tort law as the party engag-
ing in the wrongful conduct-for example, as an ingestor of illegal drugs
or even inappropriate prescription drugs.7 0 Even those cases, however,
bear at least some resemblance to tort or criminal precepts about noxious
conduct.
Moving from tort or criminal precepts, where one can identify an
agent of harm, to the bare language of rights, however, suggests that we
recognize responsibility not only to avoid harming an individual, but af-
firmatively to "rescue" an individual from more naturally occurring harm.
Combined with the availability of prenatal testing and legal abortion, the
right to sound mind and body suggests-as the California court in
Curlender suggested-that the mother of a child who will suffer because of
congenital impairments has an affirmative obligation to step in and alleviate
(through abortion) that potential child's fated suffering.
In such a view, prenatal testing and its acceptance, or welcome, as a
tool in the management of pregnancy, increases not parental choice but
parental obligation. The parent who does carry to term a child with anom-
alies detectable in utero is, in the minds of many, a responsible party.71 As
Ruth Hubbard explains, the mother of such a child is now potentially at
fault according to the moral if not yet the legal censure of society.72 The
child's right not to be born to suffering requires the prospective parents to
choose the medical solution of abortion over other, more individualized
responses to their family's suffering.
B. The Right to Die
In Nietzsche's The Birth of Tragedy from the Spirit of Music, Midas asks
Silenus what fate is best for a man, and Silenus answers,
Oh wretched ephemeral race, children of chance and misery, why do ye
compel me to tell you what it were most expedient for you not to hear?
70 See In re Baby X, 293 N.W.2d 736, 739 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980) (holding that a newborn
suffering drug withdrawal symptoms because of prenatal drug addiction may be considered a
neglected child; "[s]ince a child has a legal right to begin life with a sound mind and body,.., we
believe it is within this best interest to examine all prenatal conduct bearing on that right");
Stephen Goldsmith, Prosecution to Enhance Treatment, 19 U.S. DEPARTMENT oF HEALTH AND HuMAN
SERVlCES CHILDREN TODAY 13 (1990) (describing various prosecutions for women giving birth to
drug-addicted babies); Grodin v. Grodin, 301 N.W.2d 869, 870 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980) (finding
that because a child has a "legal right to begin life with a sound mind and body," a child could
maintain an action against his mother on grounds that his mother negligently failed to seek
proper prenatal care, failed to ask her doctor to test her for pregnancy, and failed to tell her
doctors she was taking the drug tetracycline which caused the child's teeth to be discolored); see
also Bonte v. Bonte, 616 A.2d 464, 466 (N.H. 1992) (holding that a child could maintain action
against his mother for her negligence in failing to use reasonable care in crossing street).
71 In The Tentative Pregnancy, Barbara Katz Rothman notes the societal pressure on women
"not to bring into the world" a child who is disabled. "Blame begins to insinuate itself. The birth
of a severely disabled child, when the disability could have been prenatally diagnosed and the
pregnancy terminated, begins to be seen as an act of irresponsibility. The standards of produc-
tion rise, and we are to be held accountable by those standards." RoTHMAN, supra note 54, at 227.
72 Ruth Hubbard, Eugenics: New Tools, Old Ideas, 13 WoMEN & HEALTH 225, 232 (1987).
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What is best of all is beyond your reach forever: not to be born, not to be,
to be nothing. But the second best for you-is quickly to die.73
While Silenus's statement may not reflect our attitude toward a healthy
life, it does seem much like our developing understanding of what one
should do about a severely "unhealthy" life when there is little or no possi-
bility of medical cure or effective treatment. The life predicted to come
into being without good health should be avoided, if possible, through pre-
natal testing and abortion. At the other edge of life, the dying process of a
suffering patient should be capable, at the behest of the patient (or her
surrogate decision maker), of acceleration.
In the early days of modem medical science, suffering did not merit
such deference. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, physicians
generally would not consider reducing the suffering of a patient if doing so
increased the risk of death; rather, "saving life held absolute priority over
avoiding suffering. '74 During the 1800s, however, the discovery of anesthe-
sia required surgeons to begin developing a more "utilitarian professional-
ism"75 that permitted a weighing of the risks of injury from anesthesia or
pain-killing drugs against the benefits to the patient of less pain and suffer-
ing. The prolonging of life or improvement of health and the reduction of
suffering are now dual goals in medicine, 76 although life and health still
appear more important than the reduction of suffering when medicine can
provide potential solutions toward these ends. Aggressive treatments are
still often pursued on slim chances of success because of the physician's
belief in the priority of preserving life. For example, physicians do not
hesitate to prescribe chemotherapy and radiation treatments for cancer
where there is a great possibility of suffering induced by the treatments
against a disproportionately small chance of cure. The presumption in
hospitals is that an individual, no matter how ill, desires resuscitation un-
less she has consented to a "do not resuscitate" (DNR) order.77 Despite
these longstanding assumptions in favor of life, however, the culture of
medicine is undergoing a change in its understanding of the relationship
between life prolongation and suffering. Where medicine cannot provide a
means for prolonging life and cannot significantly improve the quality of
life of the very ill, medicine is increasingly open to the idea of relief from
suffering through death, which is a shift from the mere acceptance of an in-
creased risk of death occasioned by the use of painkillers (the doctrine of
"double effect"). Is the excessive morphine prescribed for the cancer pa-
tient designed to relieve her pain at an increased risk to her life (an appli-
cation of the doctrine of double effect, which even the Catholic Church
73 FRIEDRICH WILHELM NET=SCHE, The Birth of Tragedy from the Spirit of Music, in THE PHILOSO-
PHY OF NiErZSCHE 951, 926 (Clifton Fadiman trans., 1954).
74 Pemick, supra note 9, at 26-27. Pernick further writes, "[I]n the half-century prior to the
discovery of anesthesia, American physicians and surgeons generally defined professional duty as
demanding the unhesitating infliction of extreme suffering in order to save lives." Id at 28.
75 Id. at 26.
76 Id.
77 Kathleen M. Boozang, Death Wish: Resuscitating Self-Determination for the Critically R4, 35 Ayaz.
L. REv. 23 (1993). Some states, by statute, require this presumption. See, e.g., N.Y. PUB. HEATH
LAw § 2962.1 (McKinney 1996).
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accepts),78 or is it instead intended to relieve her pain by taking her life?
Jack Kevorkian was acquitted by Michigan juries in 1994 and 1996 of
charges that he illegally assisted the suicides of individuals suffering from
terminal diseases, because jury members determined that he had not in-
tended the deaths of the individuals but that he intended instead to relieve
their pain and suffering.79 Kevorkian continues to crusade for what he has
called "a fundamental human right-the right not to suffer-that cannot be
taken away by any law."80
Physician-assisted suicide and withdrawal of life support are two situa-
tions in which patients look for, and doctors may be willing to provide,
relief from suffering through death. These are situations where not only
are physicians asked to and often willing to participate in the dying process
by providing medical assistance to that end,8' but where individuals have
asserted with some success that they are entitled to such assistance, that
they have a right to die.
The debate surrounding both of these situations-physician-assisted
suicide and withdrawal of life support-focuses predominantly upon the
extent to which we should recognize an individual patient's right to auton-
omy. And no wonder. The principle of autonomy has emerged in this
century as preeminent among the other traditional a priori or universal
principles of biomedical ethics-beneficence, nonmaleficence and distrib-
78 See CHARLES E. RICE, 50 QUESTIONS ON THE NATURAL LAW: WHAT IT IS AND WHY WE NEED
IT 290-91 (1993) (observing that Catholic teaching accepts the principle of the double effect to
justify the morality of "indirect abortions ... [when] the death of the child is an unintended
effect of an operation independently justified by the necessity of saving the mother's life").
79 David Margolick, Kevorkian's Trial Has Come to End But Debate on Assisted Suicide Hasn' N.Y.
TMits, May 4, 1994, at A16; Kelly A. Anderson, Kevorkian Acquitted for the Second Time ASSOCIATED
PREss, March 8, 1996, available in 1996 WL 4415582. In both cases Kevorkian was charged under
a 15-month ban on assisted suicide passed by the state legislature in 1992 to stop him. He is also
being prosecuted for assisting in the deaths of two women in 1991 in violation of a common law
prohibition against assisted suicide. Id. Kevorkian insisted in both trials in which he was acquit-
ted that "his primary intent was to relieve suffering, and death was the only option available." Id.
This characterization of his actions was designed to exempt them from the Michigan statute ban-
ning assisted suicide, which excepts the administration of "medications or procedures if the in-
tent is to relieve pain or discomfort and not to cause death, even if the medication or procedure
may hasten or increase the risk of death." MxcH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 752.1027(3) (West Supp.
1996-97). Yale Karnisar explains that in the 1994 prosecution jurors were confused about the
distinction between Kevorkian's motive (to relieve Hyde of his suffering) and his intent (to bring
about Hyde's death). Yale Kamisar, Physician-Assisted Suicide: The Last Bridge to Active Voluntary
Euthanasia, in ETHNASIA EXAMINED 225, 257 n.116 (John Keown ed., 1995). "The exception
applies when death is a byproduct of attempts to relieve suffering by increasing the dose of narcot-
ics; it does not apply when death is the result intended-when the defendant means to bring about
death as a way to end the patient's suffering." Id. A similar confusion plagued the 1996 jury.
Anderson, supra.
80 Kevorkian Vows to Keep Fighting Laws Barring Assisted Suicide, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 1994, § 1,
at 43 (emphasis added). Regarding the 1996 acquittal, Kevorkian's lawyer Geoffrey Fieger said
the verdict showed that "the people of America are not going to allow certain government offi-
cias to tell us at the end of our life how much we have to suffer. This is not about the right to
die. It is about the right not to suffer." Anderson, supra note 79.
81 A recent study revealed that 26% of 828 physicians questioned had been asked at some
point in their career to assist a patient in dying. Physicians Admit They Aid Suicides, DES MOINES
REGISTER, March 27, 1996, at 3. Twenty-four percent of patients who requested such aid received
it. Id. In another recent study, seven percent of Oregon physicians said they had prescribed a
lethal dose of medicine to a patient who had asked for it. Melinda A. Lee, et al., LegalizingAssisted
Suicide-Views of Physicians in Oregon, 334 NEW ENG. J. MED. 313 (1996).
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utive justice.8 2 Autonomy is firmly grounded in our Constitution's protec-
tion of individual liberty; accordingly, liberty interests have been relied
upon to support a Constitutional right to physician-assisted suicide and
withdrawal of life support.83
To be sure, notions of autonomy have had undeniably positive, hu-
manitarian effects upon the medical profession's treatment of patients.
The law has promoted physician respect for patient autonomy in its re-
quirements concerning informed consent,84 in permitting an individual
through an executed gift document to determine whether to donate or-
gans upon death,85 and in allowing individuals through advance directives
to direct physicians regarding whether to initiate and continue life-sus-
taining medical procedures in the event of the patient's later incompe-
tency.86 In each of these instances, however, there remains substantial
physician discretion, autonomy being compromised by a number of forces,
some avoidable, such as physicians' difficulty in adequately communicating
the risks and benefits of treatment to patients in a way that they can under-
stand,87 as well as their apparent failings in discerning and following pa-
82 ToM L. BEUCHAMP &JAMFS F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHics 38 (1994) (not-
ing that nonmaleficence and beneficence in medical ethics, historically prominent, have been
eclipsed by concerns about autonomy and justice).
83 See, e.g., Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 793, 798 (9th Cir.) (holding
that the Constitution encompasses a due process liberty interest in controlling the time and man-
ner of one's death, which includes a right of terminally ill, competent adults to physician-assisted
suicide), cert. granted sub nom. Washington v. Glucksberg, 65 U.S.L.W. 3085 (U.S. Oct. 1, 1996);
Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 287 (1990) (O'Connor, J., concurring)
("[a] protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment may be inferred from our
prior decisions ... and ... the refusal of artificially delivered food and water is encompassed
within that liberty interest"). A right to physician-assisted suicide has also been successfully
brought on equal protection grounds. See Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 64
U.S.L.W. 3795 (U.S. Oct. 1, 1996) (declining to recognize a fundamental due process right to
physician-assisted suicide, but declaring New York statutes in violation of Equal Protection Clause
because they treated terminally ill patients differently; those on life-support systems could require
their removal, while those not on life-support could receive no physician assistance in ending
their lives); Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 850 F. Supp. 1454 (W.D. Wash. 1994) (holding
that a Washington statute proscribing physician-assisted suicide violates the Equal Protection
Clause because it impermissibly treats similarly situated groups of terminally ill patients differ-
ently; the Ninth Circuit on appeal did not resolve the question of equal protection violation),
affid en banc, 79 F.3d 790 (9th Cir.), cert. granted sub nom. Washington v. Glucksberg, 65 U.S.L.W.
3085 (U.S. Oct. 1, 1996).
84 The doctrine of informed consent grows out of the principle that, "[elvery human being
of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his own
body ...." Schloendorffv. Society of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914) (Cardozo, J.). See
generally BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW 265-88 (1995) (explaining doctrine of informed
consent); JAY KATz, THE SILENT WORLD OF DOCTOR AND PATIENT (1984) (describing historical
development of the doctrine and the failure of physician practices to provide meaningful content
to doctrine of informed consent).
85 Unif. Anatomical Gift Act 8A U.L.A. 29 (1993). But note that doctors have long ignored
the written gift documents of potential organ donors, even when executed with all the formal
requisites of the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act, when the family of the potential donor does not
wish to donate the decedent's organs. Lois L. Shepherd, Organ Procurement and Transplantation,
in HEALTHCARE FACILmFS LAW 711, 788 (Anne M. Dellinger ed., 1991).
86 See FURROW ET AL., supra note 84, at 708-15. The Federal Patient Self-Determination Act
requires that as a condition of receiving Medicaid or Medicare funding, hospitals and other
health care facilities provide written information to each of their patients concerning an individ-
ual's rights under state law regarding advance directives and the health care facility's policies
respecting the implementation of such rights. 42 U.S.C. § 1395cc(f) (1) (A) (1994).
87 For example, studies and commentary on informed consent in practice have demon-
strated significant communication problems between patient and physician: "Many physicians
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dent preferences regarding end of life decisions;8 8 and some that may be
unavoidable, such as physician discretion regarding when a patient is ter-
minally ill or incompetent.8 9
Notions of autonomy become intertwined with concerns about suffer-
ing in end of life decisions in particular, and practices that go on under the
name of autonomy, and rights that are invoked to permit or require such
practices, are often really practices and rights driven by compassionate con-
cerns to relieve suffering.
1. Suffering or Autonomy? The Case of Physician-Assisted Suicide
Proponents of physician-assisted suicide frame the argument for legali-
zation in a way that emphasizes the autonomy of the individual: a person
has a right to do with her body as she likes, a person thus has a right to die
with dignity, in a planned and painless death.9 0 But what is also clear is
that individual patients seek recognition of a right to avoid suffering the
physical pain and mental ignominy connected to the end stages of a termi-
nal illness.9 1
In Timothy Quill's well-known letter to the New England Journal of
Medicine describing a patient's decision to take a lethal dose of barbiturates
that he prescribed,9 2 Dr. Quill describes his patient's decision to commit
suicide as a rational one-we must respect her decision because she is a
competent individual; we know she is competent because she is making a
rational decision. Why is the decision to kill herself rational? Because,
from Quill's viewpoint, she will suffer less for it. So it is her suffering, not
her autonomy that is critical;93 for if she were not to suffer, her decision
discuss risk in a more or less perfunctory manner and without much regard to how well the
patient comprehends the information. Many patients appear to understand little of the risk in-
formation and, shortly after the discussion, to recall even less." Peter H. Schuck, Rethinking In-
formed Consent, 103 YALE L.J. 899, 948 (1994). See generally Martha Minow, Telling Medical Stories:
Sharing Information AmongDoctors, Patients, and Families, 1992 UTAH L. REv. 903 (1992) (inquiring
into the difficulties of communication between physicians and patients).
88 See generally Alfred F. Conners et al., A Controlled Trial to Improve Carefor Seriously Ill Hospital-
ized Patients: The Study to Understand Prognoses and Preference for Outcomes and Risks of Treatment
(SUPPORT), 274JAMA 1591 (1995); Bernard Lo, Improving Care Near the End of Life; Why Is It So
Hard? 274JAMA 1634, 1635 (1995) (revealing only 41% of patients in SUPPORT study reported
discussing CPR or their prognosis with their physicians; physicians misunderstood patients' pref-
erence with respect to CPR in 80% of cases).
89 See Alpers & Lo, supra note 7, at 484.
90 Marcus Aurelius, a Roman emperor and stoic philosopher, wrote: "It is a shame for the
soul to be first to give way in this life, when thy body does not give way." MARcus AuRELus,
MEDrrATiONS 55 (George Long trans., 1991). The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, in its opinion
recognizing a constitutional right to physician-assisted suicide for the terminally ill, notes that
many terminally ill patients would probably identify with Marcus Aurelius. Compassion in Dying
v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 821, n.85 (9th Cir.), cert. granted sub nom. Washington v. Glucksberg,
65 U.S.L.W. 3085 (U.S. Oct. 1, 1996).
91 See generally DEREK HUMPHREY, FatAL Exrr (1991) (bestseller advocating the right to die
and outlining methods of suicide for the terminally ill).
92 Timothy E. Quill, Death and Dignity: A Case of Individualized Decision Making, 324 Naw ENG.
J. MED. 691 (1991).
93 Autonomy might be the predominant concern in these situations if in practice a more
individualized rationality were recognized; in other words, if the individual's right to choose val-
ues, including a choice to regard suffering as more evil than the expiration of life, were
respected. However, in practice we appear to be looking at the question as one of normative
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would not be rational and, therefore, would be a sign of incompetence, an
inability to make such a decision. 94
The relief of suffering is the stated purpose of Oregon's Death with
Dignity Act (Measure 16),95 which permits physicians to prescribe lethal
doses of medication to patients suffering from a "terminal disease."96 Upon
passage of the Act, Oregon became the first and only jurisdiction in the
world to legalize physician-assisted suicide.97 In August of 1995, the statute
was declared unconstitutional and enjoined by the United States District
Court in Oregon because the Act denied terminally ill patients the equal
protection of the laws regarding suicide and physician malpractice as are
granted to persons who are not terminally ill.98
rationality, respecting the decision of the individual or not according to our own notions of the
extent to which one must bear suffering. See infra note 94.
94 See CarolJ. Gill, Suicide Intevention for Persons with Disabilities: A Lesson in Inequality, 8 ISSUES
IN L. & MED. 37, 38-39 (1992) (asserting that when persons with disabilities say they want to die, it
is treated as "natural" or "reasonable," while persons without disabilities expressing the same wish
are labeled "suicidal").
Quill and two other physicians recently brought suit in federal district court in New York
challenging the constitutionality of New York statutes making it a crime to aid the commission of
suicide by a mentally competent terminally ill adult "wishing to avoid continued severe suffering."
Quill v. Koppell, 870 F. Supp. 78, 79 (S.D.N.Y. 1994). While the district court granted summary
judgment for the defendants, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that
New York's statutes criminalizing assisted suicide violated the Equal Protection Clause in their
dissimilar treatment of patients dependent on life-support systems and patients not dependent
on life-support systems. Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 64 U.S.L.W. 3795 (U.S.
Oct. 1, 1996). This unequal treatment of similarly situated individuals was not rationally related
to some legitimate state interest. Id. at 729-31. "And what business is it of the state," asked the
Court, "to require the continuation of agony when the result is imminent and inevitable?" Id. at
730.
95 Lee v. Oregon, 869 F. Supp. 1491, 1497 (D. Or. 1994) ("The state has identified its inter-
ests in Measure 16 as preventing continued pain and suffering of competent terminally ill pa-
tients and support of Oregon voters' rights to participate in the democratic process."); Lee v.
Oregon, 891 F. Supp. 1429, 1434 (D. Or. 1995) (listing "avoiding unnecessary pain and suffering"
as one of five interests claimed by the state). The statute was home of an initiative passed by
referendum in November 1994.
96 Meaning an incurable and irreversible disease that will, within reasonable medical judg-
ment, produce death within six months. 1995 Or. Laws ch. 3, § 1.01(12). The Act has a number
of procedural safeguards, such as the requirement of a second physician's opinion regarding the
terminal condition of the patient, and requirements of both written and oral requests made over
time. The patient must also be considered by the two physicians certifying to the terminal prog-
nosis to be capable of acting voluntarily and to have made an informed decision. Id. at § 3.02,
3.06. See generally Alpers & Lo, supra note 7.
97 In the Netherlands, physician-assisted suicide is illegal, although physicians who partici-
pate in acts of suicide according to certain standards are not prosecuted. Richard Fenigsen,
Euthanasia in the Netherlands, 6 IssuEs IN L. & MED. 229, 231-32 (1990). In 1991 and 1992, Wash-
ington and California also considered similar initiatives, but these were defeated. Cheryl K.
Smith, What About Legalized Assisted Suicide?, 8 IssuEs IN L. & MED. 503 (1993).
98 Lee v. Oregon, 891 F. Supp. 1429 (D. Or. 1995) (granting plaintiffs' motion for summary
judgment as to Equal Protection Clause claim); Lee v. Oregon, 891 F. Supp. 1439 (D. Or. 1995)
(granting permanent injunction against recognition of Measure 16).
The court noted the following deficiencies in the Act: physicians not trained in psychiatry or
psychology could make the evaluation whether a condition of the patient was causing impaired
judgment; there was no requirement that the person seeking assistance in dying consult a special-
ist to explore social services that might aid in the individual's comfort; the term "terminal dis-
ease" was imprecise; the consulting physician required to confirm that the person seeking
assistance in dying is capable and acting voluntarily was not independent, but was referred by the
attending physician; the waiting period between an initial oral request for assistance and the
written prescription was too short; there was no protection for ensuring that at the time the lethal
prescription was taken the decision was rationally and voluntarily made.
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What is important for purposes of this discussion is the Act's treatment
of concerns about suffering and autonomy. While the request of the pa-
tient is required and some safeguards were placed in the Act to guard
against coercion of the patient, if the initiative were about respecting the
autonomy of persons, it would permit anyone who was capable of making
an informed decision to get a prescription for lethal doses of medication.
Why does the Act insist that individuals be terminally ill? Because the ter-
minally ill are thought to suffer without cause; they are not in a situation
where the suffering should be borne because of the brighter outcome on
the other side of the suffering. Medicine cannot provide the bridge to the
healthy life. Medicine can provide relief from the suffering only through
assistance in ending the life of the one who suffers. The prevention of pain
and suffering of terminally ill patients was explicitly identified by the State
of Oregon as the interest it was promoting by the Death with Dignity Act in
the litigation challenging the constitutionality of the statute.99
The justification of suffering and the connection between rights and
suffering are most apparent in the litigation challenging the constitutional-
ity of laws banning physician-assisted suicide. 100 In Compassion in Dying v.
Washington,10 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals declared that Washing-
ton's statutory ban on physician-assisted suicide violated the constitution-
ally protected liberty interests of terminally ill patients under the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.102 While the court de-
clared that it is the terminally ill patient's liberty interest in controlling "the
time and manner of death" that is unconstitutionally burdened by the pro-
hibition against physician-assisted suicide, the decision is driven by con-
cems about suffering1 03 The opinion describes in some detail the pain
With respect to the equal protection claim regarding malpractice, the court determined that
Measure 16 unconstitutionally adopted a "good faith" standard of care for a physician's participa-
tion under the Act instead of the generally applicable objective medical community standard of
care for medical malpractice actions. Lee, 891 F. Supp. at 1435-37.
99 Another interest it cited was "support of Oregon voters' right to participate in the demo-
cratic process." Lee v. Oregon, 869 F. Supp. 1491, 1497 (D. Or. 1994).
100 Several courts have denied the existence of a constitutionally protected right to physician-
assisted suicide. See, e.g., People v. Kevorkian, 527 N.W.2d 714, 733 (Mich. 1994), cert. denied, 115
S. Ct. 1795 (1995) (holding Due Process Clause of federal constitution does not encompass fun-
damental right to commit suicide, with or without the assistance of a physician); Donaldson v.
Lungren, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 59 (Ct. App. 1992) (holding patient suffering from brain tumor does
not have a constitutional right to assisted premortem cryogenic suspension of his body). But see
Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.Sd 716 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 64 U.S.L.W. 3795 (U.S. Oct. 1, 1996) (declining
to recognize a fundamental due process right to physician-assisted suicide, but holding the New
York statutes prohibiting assistance in dying violated the Equal Protection Clause by impermissi-
bly treating similarly situated people differently in that they prohibited terminally ill patients
from seeking physician-assisted suicide, but allowed patients to require removal of life-support
systems).
101 79 F.3d 790 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. granted sub nom. Washington v. Glucksberg, 65
U.S.L.W. 8085 (U.S. Oct. 1, 1996), revkg49 F.3d 586 (9th Cir. 1995) (three-judge panel).
102 Id. at 838. The district court whose decision is affirmed by the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals also determined that the statute in question violated the Equal Protection Clause in that
it impermissibly treated similarly situated people differently by prohibiting terminally ill patients
from seeking physician-assisted suicide but allowing patients to require removal of life-supportsystem . Compassion in Dyingv. Washington, 850 F. Supp. 1454 (W.D. Wash. 1994), af/d en banc
79 F.3d 790 (9th Cir.), cert. granted sub nor. Washington v. Glucksberg, 65 U.S.L.W. 3085 (U.S.
Oct. 1, 1996).
103 The court acknowledges that its conclusion that the Constitution provides a due process
liberty interest in controlling the time and manner of one's death is "strongly influenced by, but
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and suffering of the three terminally ill plaintiffs, one dying of cancer, one
of AIDS, and one of emphysema and heart failure. The descriptions pro-
vided are heartrending:
James Poe is a 69-year-old retired sales representative who suffers from
emphysema, which causes him a constant sensation of suffocating. He is
connected to an oxygen tank at all times, and takes morphine regularly to
calm the panic reaction associated with his feeling of suffocation. Mr.
Poe also suffers from heart failure related to his pulmonary disease which
obstructs the flow of blood to his extremities and causes severe leg
pain.1 0
4
The court's descriptions of the suffering of some terminally ill patients
leads into and supports its analysis that the state's interests in preventing
physician-assisted suicide do not outweigh the liberty interests of terminally
ill patients in seeking such assistance. The degree of suffering of terminally
ill patients determines both the strength of their liberty interest in pursu-
ing physician-assisted suicide and the relative weakness of the state's inter-
ests in prohibiting such practices. According to the court:
[A]n individual's liberty interest in hastening his death is at its low point
when that person is young and healthy, because forcing a robust individ-
ual to continue living does not, at least absent extraordinary circum-
stances, subject him to "pain... [and] suffering that is too intimate and
personal for the State to insist on . 1..."105
Drawing from Casey, the court analogizes the intimate and personal choice
of a woman to abort a fetus to the intimate and personal choice of a termi-
nally ill patient to commit suicide.'0 6 Indeed, it finds Casey "almost pre-
not limited to, the plight of mentally competent, terminally ill adults. We are influenced as well
by the plight of others, such as those whose existence is reduced to a vegetative state or a perma-
nent and irreversible state of unconsciousness." Compassion in Lying 79 F.3d at 816. Because
persons who are incompetent share the same constitutional rights as those who are competent,
decisions to seek physician aid in dying would have to be made on the basis of perceptions of
suffering and indignity, rather than individual definitions of "one's own concept of existence, of
meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life." Id. at 813 (citing Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) (plurality opinion)); see also infra notes 116-17 and
accompanying text.
104 Compassion in Dying 79 F.3d at 795 (quoting from the district court opinion, Compassion in
Dying, 850 F. Supp. at 1456-57). The district court opinion also includes declarations submitted
by the physician plaintiffs as to the suffering of their patients interested in assisted suicide:
The cancer patient is fully aware of his or her present suffering and anticipates certain
future suffering. The terminal cancer patient faces a future that can be terrifying. Near
the end, the cancer patient is usually bedridden, rapidly losing mental and physical
functions, often in excruciating, unrelenting pain. Pain management at this stage often
requires the patient to choose between enduring unrelenting pain or surrendering an
alert mental state because the dose of drugs adequate to alleviate the pain will impair
consciousness.
Compassion in Dying, 850 F. Supp. at 1457.
105 Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 833 (citing Casey, 505 U.S. at 852). The Compassion in Dying
decision recognizes the Casey Court's statement that pregnancy involves "suffering [that] is too
intimate and personal for the State to insist, without more, upon its own vision of the woman's
role, however dominant that vision has been in the course of our history and culture." Compas-
sion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 804 (citing Casey, 505 U.S. at 852).
106 Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 813.
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scriptive" on the issue.107 Casey, as the opinion of the Ninth Circuit points
out, "spoke of the suffering of the pregnant woman, which 'is too intimate
and personal for the State to insist, without more, upon its own vision of
the woman's role .... "'108 The court here concluded that the suffering of
a terminally ill person who cannot hasten his own death was no less deserv-
ing of "a most vital liberty interest."' 09 The strength of the liberty interest
in controlling the time and manner of one's death is dependent on the
individual's physical condition, and that interest is at its height when "his
remaining days are an unmitigated torture.""10
The Compassion in Dying court also considered the suffering of termi-
nally ill patients in determining the relative weakness of the state's interest
in prohibiting physician-assisted suicide. Just as the liberty interest is
strongest when suffering may thereby be avoided, so too the state's interest
in legislation that burdens such liberty interest is weakest when the legisla-
tion serves to perpetuate suffering. The state's interests in preserving life
and preventing suicide"' are both "substantially diminished" when a termi-
nally ill adult wishes to end his life in "the final stages of an incurable and
painful degenerative disease, in order to avoid debilitating pain and a hu-
miliating death.""u 2 The Court writes: "Not only is that state's interest in
preventing such individuals from hastening their deaths of comparatively
little weight, but its insistence on frustrating their wishes seems cruel
indeed."": 3
Suffering, real or projected, as understood in terms of pain or indig-
nity, defines the right to physician-assisted suicide under the analysis of the
Ninth Circuit in Compassion in Dying. If states may continue to prohibit
physician-assisted suicide in cases in which the individual is not terminally
ill (i.e., in the Court's analysis, suffering without cause), because the liberty
interest is weaker in such cases and the related state interests stronger, then
the content of this liberty interest has less to do with "defin [ing] one's own
concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of
human life," as the Casey opinion describes the heart of liberty," 4 and
more to do with suffering.115 Indeed, it has everything to do with suffering.
107 Id. (agreeing with district judge in finding Supreme Court's reasoning in Casey "highly
instructive" and "almost prescriptive" on issue of the liberty interests of terminally ill persons)
(citing Compassion in Dying, 850 F. Supp. at 1459).
108 Compassion in Dying, 79 F.Sd at 804 (citing Casey, 505 U.S. at 852).
109 Compassion in Dying, 79 F.Sd at 814.
110 Id. at 834. Earlier in the opinion the Court describes the suffering of the terminally ill not
in terms of pain, but in terms of their loss of dignity- "A competent terminally ill adult, having
lived nearly the full measure of his life, has a strong liberty interest in choosing a dignified and
humane death rather than being reduced at the end of his existence to a childlike state of help-
lessness, diapered, sedated, incontinent." Id. at 813.
111 These are two of the six related state interests identified in Compassion in Dying. The
others are: the state's interest in avoiding the involvement of third parties and in precluding the
use of arbitrary, unfair, or undue influence; the state's interest in protecting family members and
loved ones; the state's interest in protecting the integrity of the medical profession; and the
state's interest in avoiding adverse consequences that might ensue if the statutory provision at
issue is declared unconstitutional. Id. at 816-17.
112 Id. at 820.
113 Id.
114 Casey, 505 U.S. at 851 (1992) (plurality opinion).
115 As the three-member panel of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals wrote in its decision
reversing the District Court: "If at the heart of the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amend-
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This is made even clearer by the Compassion in Dying Court's intimation
that an incompetent, terminally ill patient may be entitled to seek physi-
cian assistance in suicide through a surrogate decisionmaker because "a
decision of a duly appointed surrogate decision maker is for all legal pur-
poses the decision of the patient himself."1 6 In addition, the Court re-
fused to "intimate any view as to the constitutional or legal implications" of
the practice of involuntary euthanasia." 7 The availment of physician-as-
sisted suicide by incompetent individuals through surrogate deci-
sionmakers would clearly have to draw its support from concerns about
suffering, not autonomy, as would involuntary euthanasia.
2. Withdrawal of Life Support
The willingness of medical care providers and courts to follow the
wishes of the patient to discontinue life-sustaining treatments is likewise
bound up in their perception of the patient's suffering.
In the 1980s Elizabeth Bouvia brought suit to have a nasogastric tube
providing her with nutrition and hydration removed and eventually re-
ceived a court order to that end." 8 Bouvia was not terminally ill and, in
fact, was expected to live fifteen or twenty more years."l 9 However, as in
the case of terminally ill patients seeking physician aid in dying, her medi-
cal condition was not subject to cure and her physical ailments perma-
nently and irreversibly impaired her ability to function. She suffered from
cerebral palsy, quadriplegia, and arthritis. 20 She subsisted on public assist-
ance and was without an adequate family or social network to help in her
care. She ended up in the hospital, although medical treatment was not
really indicated. It is apparent that she wanted to die because she suffered,
although it is certainly not clear that some of her suffering could not have
been alleviated with nursing care, housing, or assisted living.' 2 '
The court in Bouvia recognizes her right to have the nasogastric tube
withdrawn on the basis of her right to refuse medical treatment, even that
which is life-sustaining.122 But a recognition of a right to forgo medical
treatment or life support that is based solely in concerns about the individ-
ual's liberty or autonomy would not require the court to discuss at length,
as this court did, the diminished quality of Bouvia's life. While the court
states that this decision is one for Bouvia alone to make, it affirms the ra-
ment is this uncurtailable ability to believe and to act on one's deepest beliefs about life, the right
to suicide and the right to assistance in suicide are the prerogative of at least every sane adult."
Compassion in Dying, 49 F.3d at 591.
116 Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 832 n.120.
117 Id.
118 Bouvia v. Superior Court, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297 (Ct App. 1986).
119 Indeed, she is still alive, having decided not to have her feeding tube removed after win-
ning the court's approval to do so. According to newspaper reports, she "changed her plans
almost immediately, when she realized that it would take several painful weeks for her to die." 10
Years After Winning Right to Die, Patient Lives, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Dec. 17, 1993, at AS.
120 Bouvia, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 299, 300.
121 See Paul K. Longmore, Elizabeth Bouvia, Assisted Suicide and Social Prudice, 3 IssuEs IN L. &
MED. 141, 152-57 (1987) (describing Bouvia's life-long encounters with prejudice and the per-
sonal stresses-a miscarriage and separation from her husband-that preceded her petition for
removal of her feeding tube).
122 Bouvia, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 305.
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tionality of that decision.' 23 As the court writes, "[i]n Elizabeth Bouvia's
view, the quality of her life has been diminished to the point of hopeless-
ness, uselessness, unenjoyability and frustration. She, as the patient, lying
helplessly in bed, unable to care for herself, may consider her existence
meaningless. She cannot be faulted for so concluding."124 While the court men-
tions the petitioner's pain ("endurable only by the constant administra-
tions of morphine"),125 it appears most concerned with her loss of dignity.
Because of her physical dependence upon others, she is "imprisoned and
must lie physically helpless subject to the ignominy, embarrassment, humil-
iation and dehumanizing aspects created by her helplessness."1 26 Follow-
ing that statement, the court refers to Bouvia as a "sufferer."' 27
A similar interplay between suffering and autonomy is present in cases
involving the withdrawal of life support for the incompetent patient who
was once competent, such as Karen Anne Quinlan128 or Nancy Beth
Cruzan.129 Once again, the right to die is asserted when medical science
can find neither a cure for the underlying condition nor improve function-
ing ability. If in these cases we can determine the patient's wishes regard-
ing medical treatment through her advance directive or other evidence of
her desires prior to incompetency, then it may be her autonomy that we
are respecting by recognizing her right to die.' 30 But without these, and
similarly, in the case of individuals who have never been competent, when
we talk about a right to die, we are not talking about autonomy, but about a
right based in suffering in the sense of diminished quality of life.' 3 ' Often
the individual is not actually suffering physical pain or even emotional dis-
123 Id. at 804-05; see also Loren H. Roth et al., Tests of Competency to Consent to Treatmen 134 AM.
J. PsYcHmTRY 279, 281 (1977) (asserting that in situations where the court is looking to the rea-
sonableness of the patient's decision, whether explicitly so or not, "if patients do not decide the
'wrong' way, the issue of competency will probably not arise").
124 Bouvia, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 304 (emphasis added).
125 Id. at 305.
126 Id.
127 Id. (stating "we do not believe it is the policy of this State that all and every life must be
preserved against the will of the sufferer").
128 In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976).
129 Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
130 It is questionable, of course, whether the wishes of the individual expressed prior to the
onset of incompetency are an appropriate measure of the wishes she would have now if she could
know and express them. When, as a competent individual, she described the conditions under
which she would prefer the withdrawal of medical treatment, she arguably did not know what she
would want when in that later position of incompetency. In a sense, she is one person prior to
incompetency and one person after, and so, in a very odd way, cannot speak for herself either
before or after incompetency regarding her treatment preferences during the later period of
incompetency.
Whether a right to refuse medical treatment, even life-sustaining medical treatment, can be
made on the basis of autonomy, unencumbered by quality of life assessments made by members
of the medical profession, is another question. While I do not attempt to answer that question
here, it seems that to the extent we adopt a value system that puts the absence of suffering (espe-
cially suffering in the broad sense in which I use that term in this Article, which includes loss of
dignity) above life, these decisions cannot be considered to be made purely autonomously.
131 Yale Kamisar writes:
Although the Quinlan case was widely reported and discussed as a "right to die" case,
Karen Ann Quinlan lacked the capacity to request anything. She did not (and in her
condition, of course, could not) consent to her death or ask anyone to let her die. Nor
had she made a living will or executed any other directive requesting that she be allowed
to die without medical intervention.
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tress as a result of lost abilities or knowledge of impending death. The
incompetent patient might be unaware of such matters. As such she "suf-
fers" chiefly a loss of dignity.
In cases of both physician-assisted suicide and withdrawal of life sup-
port, issues of autonomy are present, but not predominant. It is most accu-
rate to think of autonomy as the means by which the claim comes before
the court, which is comfortable with the language of autonomy, individual-
ism, and liberty. But autonomy is not the deciding factor in these cases.
Whether the claimant is considered competent and thus bringing the re-
quest capably and independent of coercion depends upon how much the
claimant suffers and whether that level of suffering is an adequate reason
to reach such a drastic decision. The suffering, the terminally ill, the alien-
ated with disabilities, seek a right to die based on our compassion not be-
cause they seek autonomy, but because they have lost orfear losing autonomy.
Our compassion does not give them this autonomy; it depends, rather, on
the surrender of that autonomy to a medical professional.
III. WHY SUCH RIGHTS? WHY Now?
I think we can look at a number of possible reasons why there is pres-
sure to talk about and recognize rights based in suffering, especially in the
delivery of care at the edges of life. First, we now rely heavily and increas-
ingly upon science, and more particularly on technology,132 to answer life's
challenges, and to solve life's problems. This means that we turn to
medicine not only to provide relief from or cure of disease, but also to
provide solutions for aging, for childlessness, and for undesirable inherited
traits. We also look to medicine to define for us what good health is, to tell
us what is "normal" and what is not, which conditions are desirable and
which are undesirable, what amount of suffering must be tolerated and
how much is too much. Second, we appear to be developing a collective
conscience, a shared empathy, and a feeling of responsibility for the wel-
fare of others, especially in matters of health. As this collective conscience
develops in a country whose jurisprudence gives great deference to individ-
ual rights, there is a developing sense that in matters of social welfare we
have certain rights. These certain "positive" rights are rights to certain
goods or services, rather than simply rights to non-interference with re-
spect to obtaining such goods or services. This plays out in the health care
Yale Kamisar, When Is There a Constitutional "Right to Die"? When Is There No Constitutional "Right to
Live"?, 25 GA. L. REV. 1203, 1208 (1991). In cases like Quinlan and Cruzan, where termination of
life-sustaining treatment is sought for an individual who is not terminally ill but is in a persistent
vegetative state, the principal argument for terminating treatment is that she is "better off dead"
or "might as well be dead," which grapples with "the hopelessly elusive question of a life not
worth living." Id. at 1212 (citing RICHARD SHERLOCK, PRESERVING LIFE: PUBLIC POLICY AND THE
LIFE NOT WORTH LIVING 137 (1987)); see also Bernadette Tobin, Did You Think About Buying Her a
Cat? Some Reflections on the Concept of Autonomy, 11 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 417 (1995).
132 Science is a mode of thinking whereby experimentation and exacting logic are used "to
explain observed phenomena." EDWARD S. GOLUB, THE LIMrrs OF MEDICINE 44 (1994). Science is
in effect an attempt to know the world; technology is the tool through which scientific principles
are applied. Id. While science is "based on the idea that the world is knowable.... [tjechnology
is based on the idea that we can bring about purposeful change; it is knowledge that is applied."
Id.
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arena in an incrementally emerging right to health care. This right
emerges in those situations when our collective conscience cannot turn
awaym-when the suffering is acute and visible-such as when a patient ar-
rives at the emergency room in need of immediate attention.13 In the
situations I have described in the first Section of this Article, those situa-
tions at the edges of life, the developing collective conscience pushes us to
recognize the individual's right to the best that medicine can provide to
alleviate or avoid suffering; in those situations, the best that medicine can
provide is a route to the avoidance or termination of life itself.
A. Medical Science and Technology
We are adopting essentially a medical model in our response to suffer-
ing that incorporates medical definitions and perceptions of suffering,
medical perceptions and tolerances of risk, and medical solutions to suffer-
ing through technology.
With respect to perceptions of suffering, we look to medical science to
provide not just information but also opinions about what nature has dealt
us in terms of our physical and mental attributes and to determine what it
means to suffer.134 We often assume suffering when there is a deviation
from the norm in appearance or abilities: persons with disabilities suffer,
the elderly person who can no longer take care of herself suffers, the per-
son with a cleft palate suffers, the infertile suffer.
Science has created some of the expectations about how life should
be, thus causing us to turn to science to realize those expectations for us.'3 5
For example, with the availability of new reproductive technologies we ex-
pect fertility. With the advent of a supposed "cure," a failure to conceive is
adjudged to be due to an infertility problem at a much earlier time than
had previously been the case. Rather than expecting couples to try to get
133 In such instances the hospital and the physicians staffing the emergency room have a
statutory duty to stabilize the patient prior to transfer to another facility. See infra note 178 and
accompanying text.
134 Some of the situations thatwe turn to science to solve have arguably not only been defined
by science, but have been created by the science itself, which has clearly prolonged the dying
process and thus caused some patients to insist they have a right to withdrawal of life sustaining
treatment. In this article I am more concerned with naturally caused suffering (or perceived
suffering), with what nature has dealt us, and how we look to medical science to provide the
means by which to judge what we have been dealt and determine if it falls below a certain level of
acceptability.
135 Edward Golub argues that although "[b]y all objective standards, people in the industrial-
ized nations are healthier than they ever have been.... there is growing dissatisfaction with
health care and growing evidence that people perceive themselves as less healthy." GOLUB, supra
note 132 at 224. He argues that:
[W]e have all been willing partners in making promises about and expecting miracles
from scientific medicine. Scientists have promised wondrous cures as a result of basic
research, physicians have promised to roll back death and eliminate pain through spe-
cialization and high-tech medicine, the pharmaceutical industry warns that if profits are
curtailed they will stop developing innovative lifesaving drugs, the press breathlessly re-
ports yet another medical miracle, and patients urge all of them on by wanting desper-
ately to believe each of them.
Id. Golub believes that our current health care problems arise in part from "making science a
secular religion and then expecting miracles from it, and from not having developed a context in
which to understand and handle physical suffering and death in a scientific world." Id. at 225.
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pregnant on their own for two or three years, physicians now consider
them infertile and appropriate subjects for treatment after one year.'36
Likewise, medical technology has created for us an expectation of
healthier lives. But what is health? Others have long pointed out that med-
ical science has created disease where it did not previously exist: if alcohol-
ism is now a disease, science will be expected to provide the
pharmaceutical means to cure or control it, or to detect its possible genetic
basis and eugenically avoid it. Extreme shyness is now being treated with
prescription drugs, 3 7 as are the increasing number of children diagnosed
with attention-deficit disorder and hyperactivity.13 8 Criminal disposition
may eventually be considered a disease, or at least a medical condition, if
we find a gene for it-and scientists are busy looking.'3 9 Once found,
"criminality" would be potentially subject to a medical cure through gene
splicing or embryo selection. Researchers are looking for a gene for homo-
sexuality with the same potential consequences. 40
136 In her book, Women as Wombs, Janice Raymond suggests that, "[d]octors increasingly ex-
pand the definition of infertility. The currently accepted medical definition is inability to con-
ceive after one year of intercourse without contracepton."JANIcE G. RAYMOND, WOMEN AS WOMBS
3 (1993) (citing Erwin Chargraff, Engineering a Molecular Nightmare, 327 NATURE 199 (1987)).
Raymond notes that, "[ijn the last decade, the number of years has dwindled from two to one.
However, as many as half the couples seeking treatment for infertility will conceive in the usual
heterosexual way, without any help from fertility treatments, and even after technical fertility
treatment has failed." Id. (citation omitted).
137 Dateline (NBC television broadcast, Mar. 10, 1996) (describing how Prozac is used to treat
shyness).
138 Lyn Nell Hancock, Mother's Little Helper, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 18, 1996, at 51, 52 (reporting that
1.3 million American children take Ritalin regularly for Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder,
and that many doctors are convinced that the drug is overprescribed and that many children who
need therapy to modify their behavior and special help for school get little more than pills).
139 PA Brennen & SA Mednick, Genetic Perspectives on Crime, 370 ACTA PSYCHIAT. SCAND.
SuPP. 19 (1993) (examining the empirical evidence for a genetic influence in the etiology of
antisocial behavior); A. Freyne & A. O'Connor, XYY Genotype and Crime: 2 Cases, 32 MED. SCI. & L.
261 (1992);John Horgan, Genes and Crime: A U.S. Plan to Reduce Violence Rekindles an Old Contro-
versy, Sci. AM., Feb. 1993, at 24. But see Dwight L. Greene, Naughty by Nurture: Black MaleJoyrid-
ing-is Everything Gonna BeAlright, 4 COLUM.J. GENDER & L. 73 (1994), where the author writes:
In the context of criminal behavior, genetics is controversial in part because the predis-
position to disease is equated with a predisposition to commit certain kinds of crime,
usually violent. What is criminal, however, is socially, not physiologically determined.
The same act of violence may or may not be a crime depending upon the social signifi-
cance attached to the violence. Hitting on a football field may be sanctioned while
hitting on a street comer may not. In both cases, the propensity for violence may be
identical.
Id. at 115 n.147. Accusations of racism caused the National Institute of Health (NIH) to withdraw
funding for an academic conference on genetics and criminal behavior, entitled Genetic Factors in
Crime: Findings, Uses and Implications, that was originally scheduled to be held in October 1992 at
the University of Maryland. Dorothy E. Roberts, Crime, Race, and Reproduction, 67 TUL. L. REv.
1945, 1965 n.98 (1993) (citations omitted). In suspending its funding, the NIH claimed that the
project "too readily accepted and gave credence to the notion that violence and crime had ge-
netic causes." Maureen P. Coffey, Note, The Genetic Defense: Excuse or Explanation? 35 WM. & MARY
L. REv. 353, 353 (1993). Coffey notes that "[o]ther critics, more vehement in their attack,
charged that the conference perpetuated racist misconceptions and embodied either a 'politi-
cally-fueled revival of the discredited theories of eugenics' or 'reductionism gone wild.'" Id. (cita-
tions omitted).
140 See Dean H. Hamer et al., A Linkage Between DNA Markers on the X Chromosome and Male
Sexual Orientation, 261 SCIENCE 321 (1993) (reporting results that indicate with a statistical confi-
dence level of more than 99%, that at least one subtype of male sexual orientation is genetically
influenced); Stella Hu et al., Linkage Between Sexual Orientation and Chromosome Xq28 in Males But
Not in Females, 11 NATURE GENETICS 248 (1995) (reporting results that corroborate previously
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In addition to providing its own definitions of suffering, medicine also
prescribes tolerances for risk. 141 These prescriptions are understandably
conservative, at least with respect to circumstances over which medical sci-
ence appears to have no control. As I have noted earlier, genetic counsel-
ors and physicians working with expectant parents find risks for genetic
disabilities intolerably high, when parents may be more willing to accept
them. 142 And in at least six cases in which courts have ordered women to
undergo Cesarean sections, the women ignored the order and gave vaginal
birth to healthy babies. 143 The statistical probabilities advanced by the phy-
sicians in one of these cases, Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding County Hospital Au-
thority,14 may be instructive. In Jefferson, physicians maintained that
without surgery, the woman's condition of placenta previa posed a 99%
risk that the baby would die and a 50% chance that the pregnant woman
would die; but if the surgery were performed, both the baby and the wo-
man would have a 100% chance of survival. Perhaps this represents a
healthy distrust of results occurring naturally, without medical interven-
tion, and an equally healthy degree of physician confidence in their own
curative powers. But should these attitudes about risk be demanded of in-
dividual patients or effectively imposed upon them as we import medical
norms into our legal framework through rights based in suffering?
Finally, the medical response to suffering is to alleviate it or, if allevia-
tion is not possible, to avoid it. The risk/benefit analysis medical profes-
sionals conduct to determine whether a therapy or treatment should be
undertaken necessarily and understandably opens the discussion for qual-
ity of life assessments. Risk/benefit assessments became an accepted part
of the practice of medicine in the nineteenth century when physicians be-
gan to abandon their refusal to use anesthetic because of the risk to life. 1 5
Prior to that time, physicians were so driven by the duty to preserve life at
all cost in terms of pain or suffering that any potentially curative procedure
was undertaken, no matter how painful.1 46 The introduction of anes-
thetic-which could greatly or entirely relieve pain during a procedure,
reported linkage between the X chromosome (Xq28) and male homosexuality in selected kin-
ships); Ferren Maclntyre & Kenneth W. Estep, Sperm Competition and the Persistence of Genes for Male
Homosexuality, 31 Biosysr'ms 223 (1993) (supporting theory of genetic component to the devel-
opment of male homosexuality); William J. Turner, Homosexuality, Type L An Xq28 Phenomenon,
24 ARCHIVES OF SEXuAL BEHAVIOR 109 (1995). But note that some gays and lesbians fear that the
Hamer report, supra; "might lead to efforts to detect homosexuality, resulting in further discrimi-
nation against them." Ralph C. Brashier, Disinheritance and the Modem Family, 45 CASE W. Rs. L.
REV. 83, 160 n.247 (1994); see atsoJohn R. Quinn, The Lost Language of the lrishgaymale: Textualiza-
tion in Ireland's Law and Literature (or the Most Hidden Ireland), 26 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REV. 553,
576 (1995) (Genetics and biology may lead to intolerance or oppression, possibly even facilitating
"ghettoization, quarantine, and the like. Ultimately, biology could foster the horrors of eugenics:
the discovery of a genetic basis for homosexuality could engender efforts to eliminate or alter the
genes to 'cure' the condition, or to abort fetuses determined to carry the gene.").
141 Even using the term "risk" as opposed to a more neutral term, such as "chance," implies
value judgements about the condition being assessed. See Walter E. Nance, Parables, in PitscRiB-
ING OUR FUTURE: ETHICAL ISSUES IN GENmc COUNSELING, supra note 49, at 89, 91.
142 See supra notes 58-63 and accompanying text.
143 Janet Gallagher, Fetus as Patient; in REPRODUcrIVE LAWS FOR THE 1990s 185, 186 (Sherrill
Cohen & Nadine Taub eds., 1989).
144 274 S.E.2d 457 (Ga. 1981).
145 Pernick, supra note 9, at 29.
146 Id. at 28.
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but at some risk to life-required a rethinking of that position and a more
moderate risk/benefit approach followed.' 47
And certainly this seems reasonable enough. We see doctors as best
equipped to give us the facts-the chances, the outcomes, the conditions-
because they have experience and education in conducting such analyses.
But as anyone who has faced such wrenching choices can attest, assessing
statistics, probabilities, and risk does not take into account any personal
criteria for quality of life-our relationships, our religious beliefs, our ethi-
cal norms, our tolerance for pain, or the strength of our desire to live.
Futility is the justification physicians rely on to refuse to perform or
advise patients against certain treatments, generally life-prolonging treat-
ments. 148 Futility does not simply mean that the doctors think that this
particular treatment will fail. We have seen that in Baby K' 49 In that case
the hospital sought a declaratory judgment that, under the Emergency
Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act (EMTALA),150 the Rehabilitation
Act of 1973,151 and the Americans with Disabilities Act,' 52 it had no obliga-
tion to provide respiratory support for an anencephalic infant. The argu-
ment was not that the respiratory support would not be effective to restore
the infant's breathing; it would be. It was that the infant had no quality of
life and thus could not benefit from the restored breathing. 53 Futility, as
applied, means that the doctors do not think the treatment will enable you
147 Id. at 29.
148 Physicians sometimes rely on futility to write DNR orders for patients without their consent
or the consent of their families. There are three different justifications generally offered for
issuing a DNR order, including (1) withholding CPR where it is of no medical benefit; (2) with-
holding CPR where there will likely be a poor quality of life after CPR,- and (3) withholding CPR
where there is a poor quality of life before CPR is administered. Tom Tomlinson & Howard
Brody, Sounding Board-Ethics and Communication in Do-Not-Resuscitate Orders, 318 NEw ENG. J.
MED. 43 (1988). Tomlinson and Brody argue for the importance of making the distinction be-
tween the three. The authors believe that in the latter two situations, where the justification
depends on an assessment of quality of life, the decision must be based on the values of the
individual patient. Id. at 44; see also infra note 154.
149 In re Baby K, 832 F. Supp. 1022 (E.D. Va. 1993), affd, 16 F.3d 590 (4th Cir. 1994).
150 Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (1994).
151 Rehabilitation Act of 1973, § 504, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1994).
152 Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 376 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C., 47 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-213 (1994)). The
hospital also sought similar declaratory and injunctive relief under the Child Abuse Amendments
of 1984, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5101-06, 5111-13, 5115, 10401-15 (1994), and the Virginia Medical Malprac-
tice Act, Va. Code Ann. §§ 8.01-581.1 to .20 (Michie 1991). In re Baby K, 832 F. Supp. at 1026.
153 Baby K 832 F. Supp. at 1027. In Baby K the hospital sought to withhold ventilator treat-
ment when such treatment would be "'futile' or 'inhumane.'" Id. The court held, however, that:
The use of a mechanical ventilator to assist breathing is not "futile" or "inhumane" in
relieving the acute symptoms of respiratory difficulty which is the emergency medical
condition that must bc treated under EMTALA. To hold otherwise would allow hospi-
tals to deny emergency treatment to numerous classes of patients, such as accident vic-
tims who have terminal cancer or AIDS, on the grounds that they eventually will die
anyway from those diseases and that emergency care for them would therefore be
"futile."
Id.; see also Marcia Angell, The Case of Helga Walglie: A New Kind of "Right to Die" Case, 325 NaW ENG.
J. MED. 511 (1991) (discussing a Minnesota probate court's rejection of a hospital's effort to
replace the patient's surrogate decision maker (patient's husband) on grounds that he insisted
upon the continuation of life sustaining treatment for the elderly patient in a persistent vegeta-
tive state); and notes 273-74 and accompanying text.
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to have a good enough life.154 If the medical profession cannot give you a
better life, then perhaps you should have no life at all.
B. A Growing Collective Conscience
Along with a growing acceptance of a medical model of suffering,
changes in the legal culture reflect a heightened public awareness and ap-
preciation of others' suffering. This may be due, in part, to the fact that
historical distinctions between public and private have blurred, so that, ac-
cording to Hannah Arendt, the two realms "constantly flow into each other
like waves in the never-resting stream of the life process itself." 55 Con-
cerns that were originally and exclusively the province of the family, where
the necessary tasks for the survival of life took place, have become a "collec-
tive" concern. We are now a "collective of families economically organized
into the facsimile of one super-human family."156
Most Americans believe that through government, we have some re-
sponsibility to care for those in need. 5 7 Since the New Deal, our govern-
ment has provided a number of assistance programs for housing, food, and
other basic needs.'58 If we were to compare ours to Greek civilization, as
Arendt does, we would find that nothing like our modern understanding
regarding social responsibility existed in classic times.' 59 Nor as recently as
the nineteenth century did our nation take on such collective responsibil-
ity. But now we may be moving, slowly to be sure, into an era not only of
national superfamilies, but of one international family, with the push to-
ward human rights (revealing a concern for the welfare of all), the activism
of the United Nations and peacekeeping efforts, and the increasing ability
to become aware, through media and electronic communication, of the
needs of people in other countries.
Personal health was historically a most private aspect of life: doctors
would go to their patients' homes to administer care instead of patients
going to clinics or hospitals, and the aged would die at home instead of in
154 In her study of how physicians talk about futility, Mildred Z. Solomon found that when
physicians invoked futility arguments against pursuing further treatment for a patient, those argu-
ments "most often... were used to support evaluative judgments based on quality of life consid-
erations, only rarely to designate treatments that were medically inefficacious." Solomon writes
that throughout interviews with physicians, "physicians sought to frame value judgments as medi-
cal decisions." Mildred Z. Solomon, How Physicians Talk about Futility; Making Words Mean Too
Many Things, 21 J. LAW MED. & ETHics, 231, 232-33 (1993); see also Boozang, supra note 77, at 26
(disapproving physician adoption of a "futility" exception to DNR policies, "which allows physi-
cians to withhold CPR from patients without their consent or knowledge if the physician deter-
mines that resuscitation would not be medically beneficial").
155 HANNAH ARENDT, THE HuMA CONDITION 33 (1958). Arendt explains that what she calls
"the social realm" has, with the rise of the modem nation state, overtaken the public and private
realms in life. Id. at 28.
156 Id. at 29.
157 Current public opinion supports government's role in providing for those undergoing
economic hardship. Robert Y. Shapiro et al., The Polls: Public Assistance, 51 PUB. OPINION Q. 120
(1987). Attitudes about the need for public assistance programs have been relatively stable since
the first surveys were conducted in the 1930s. Id. at 120.
158 See generally Mcta.L B. KATz, THE UNDESERVING POOR (1989) (providing a critical histori-
cal review and an analysis of contemporary poverty policy, encompassing the period from the
1960s War on Poverty to the conservative war on welfare).
159 ARENDT, supra note 155.
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hospitals or nursing care facilities.'60 We have thankfully left behind much
of the ignorance and isolation imposed by the strictures of privacy in per-
sonal health. It is now commonplace to be privy to information about the
personal health of others; we have national pleas for transplantable organs,
television accounts of live births and heart or brain surgeries, personal ac-
counts of illnesses on talk shows, in self-help books, and even at the na-
tional conventions of political parties. Elizabeth Glaser, in a speech at the
1992 National Democratic Convention, encouraged increased federal ef-
forts in AIDS research, and described the death of her daughter from AIDS
and her own and her son's affliction with the disease.' 6 ' Additionally,
whereas breast cancer and other diseases affecting private aspects of our
bodies used to be considered subjects inappropriate for public disclosure
and discussion, this taboo has clearly (and thankfully) passed.
We are not only privy to information about the personal health of
others, we share in various ways a responsibility with respect to others'
health. Thus, we accept a national program of childhood immunizations.
Those who have private health insurance share indirectly in the costs of the
uncompensated care provided by hospitals through their practices of cost-
shifting, which leads to higher private insurance premiums.'6 2 We assume
responsibility to warn individuals of the risks of smoking, to ensure that
drugs and medical devices placed in the market are safe, and to provide,
through tax dollars, some assistance to those who need medical care.' 6 3 To
the extent that we move more toward managed care'6 with its "gatekeep-
ers" 165 and utilization review,' 6 6 along with financial incentives for physi-
cians and other providers to manage the costs of one patient with an eye
160 SeeJonathan R. MacBride, Comment, A Death Without Dignity: How the Lower Courts Have
Refused to Recognize That the Right of Privacy and the Fourteenth Amendment Liberty Interest Protect an
Individual's Choice of Physician-Assisted Suicide, 68 TEMP. L. Rav. 755 (1995), where the author
notes: "Fifty years ago most people died at home, and only twenty percent of Americans died in a
hospital or health-care facility. Today, however, eighty percent of Americans die in a hospital or
other health-care facility." Id. at 795 (citations omitted).
161 Sydney S. Schanberg, AIDS Speeches Bring Rare Moments of Stillness, NEWSDAY, July 17, 1992, at
51, available in 1992 WL 7545195.
162 Theodore R. Marmor & Michael S. Barr, Making Sense of the National Health Insurance Reform
Debate, 10 YALE L. & POL'y Rv. 228, 249 (1992); see also Robert G. Evans, Tension, Compression, and
Shear: Directions, Stresses, and Outcomes of Health Care Cost Control 15J. HEATH POL. POL'Y & L. 101
(1990).
163 It is important to note not only that we share collectively in providing care to some of
those who cannot afford it through public insurance programs, but also that the federal tax
subsidy of employer-provided health insurance (which amounted to about $33.5 billion in 1990)
means that we share collectively in the provision of such health benefits to employees who are not
poor. BARRY R. FuRRow ET AL., HEALTH LAw. CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS 543-44 (1991).
164 "Managed care" is a form of health care delivery which takes on a variety of forms and
organizations, (the most familiar of which is the health maintenance organization (HMO)),
which are "all intended to manage the use of health care services by consumers." Id. at 472.
165 Subscribers to HMOs must choose a "primary care provider," or "gatekeeper," who is re-
sponsible for controlling access to other services or specialists. Eric Larson, The Soul of an HMO,
TIME, Jan. 22, 1996, at 45, 46.
166 Typically, HMOs contract with larger groups of physicians who then provide the actual
medical care for patients. Id. When a patient seeks treatment through her gatekeeper, the gate-
keeper's recommendations must be approved by the medical group's utilization-review managers,
or by the HMO itself, before the patient can follow the physician's recommendation. Id.
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towards what resources will be left for others,167 we will only move further
toward a collectivist character in health care delivery.
This collective conscience with respect to matters of individual welfare,
and health in particular, is reflected in the incrementally growing provision
of health care in this country. The President's Commission for the Study
of Ethical Problems in Medical and Biomedical and Behavioral Research,
convened in 1983 to study the question of national health care rights and
responsibilities, decided that there was no right to health care. It neverthe-
less determined that society had an "ethical obligation to ensure equitable
access to health care for all."' 68 At that time and still today, the patchwork
of medical insurance programs for the "deserving poor,"'6 9 the elderly, the
disabled, the veterans, and others on federal, state, and local levels has
proven inadequate to ensure access to care for all.17° But while reform
efforts, at least at the federal level, have stalled or been abandoned, there
has been some expansion of legally required access to care. The expansion
is largely in the area of emergency medicine, where suffering is acute and
highly visible.
While physicians traditionally have been able to choose whom they
wish to serve,' 71 and hospitals have also at times claimed that they had no
167 HMOs collect monthly payments from subscribers, and then reserve money for administra-
tive costs, marketing costs, salaries, bonuses, and profits. i The HMO then pays the medical
group a set fee for every patient assigned to the group-a practice called capitation. Id. at 47.
The medical group withholds enough from this fee to cover operating costs and profits, then pays
the primary care physicians. Id. If a doctor spends less than the capitated rate, he makes a profit;
if he spends more he suffers a loss. Id. Thus, "[e]very time a capitated doctor performs a service
or admits a patient to a hospital it cuts into his income." Id.
168 President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical
and Behavioral Research, Securing Access to Health Care: The Ethical Implications of Differences in the
Availability of Health Services 4 (U.S. Gov't Printing Office, 1983). Note, however, that the Commis-
sion's Report stated that a similar commission in 1952 concluded that "access to the means for
the attainment and preservation of health is a basic human right." Id. (citation omitted).
169 Medicaid, the joint federal and state program organized to assist the poor by providing
health benefits, targets certain favored groups: the elderly, the blind, the permanently and totally
disabled, dependent children and their families eligible for Aid to Families with Dependent Chil-
dren, and other discrete groups of persons. FuRtow, supra note 163, at 568-69.
170 See Barry R. Furrow, Forcing Rescue: The Landscape of Health Care Provider Obligations to Treat
Patients, 3 HEA.TH MATRIx 31 (1993). According to a 1986 study, nearly 14 million Americans
said they did not even seek health care because they were unable to afford it. "The situation has
only deteriorated since 1986. 'The uninsured are less likely to ... receive prenatal care, less likely
to have their blood pressure checked, and less likely to see a physician even when they have
serious symptoms.' When uninsured patients do seek care from hospitals, they are often turned
away or superficially treated and transferred to stressed and overburdened public hospitals.
When they do receive health care in hospitals, indigent patients experience a higher mortality
rate because they do not receive as many high cost procedures." Id. at 31-32 (citations omitted).
171 A point obviously very dear to physicians; in The American Medical Association's Principes
of Medical Ethics, an avowed statement of "standards of conduct which define the essential of
honorable behavior for the physician," is the self-serving proclamation that physicians are free to
choose whom to serve. AMERiCAN MEDICAL AssOCIATION, PRINcIPLEs OF MEDicAL ETHics (1980),
quoted in BARRY R. FuRRow r A.. , Biozrisics: HEALTH CARE LAw AND ETmics 31-32 (1991). The
full provision is that "a physician shall, in the provision of appropriate patient care, except in
emergencies, be free to choose whom to serve, with whom to associate, and the environment in
which to provide medical services." Since the statement was adopted in 1980, legal recognition of
duties in some emergencies have already emerged. See infra note 172; see also Childs v. Weis, 440
S.W.2d 104, 107 (Tex. App. 1969) (holding that a doctor has no duty to treat patient in an
emergency if no doctor-patient relationship exists).
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duty to treat particular patients, 72 beginning in the 1960s, courts have
struggled with doctrine to find duties to patients in acute suffering. Thus,
a number of common law legal theories have been cited to impose upon
hospitals, and therefore upon emergency room on-call physicians, a duty to
treat patients who are in dire need of medical assistance. 73 These include
the characterization of a private hospital as a "quasi-public" entity,' 74 a reli-
ance theory based in tort, 75 and a duty imposed on the basis of public
policy, 176 all of which are theories shaky at the foundations. 177 Regulation
through liability exposure having proven on the whole ineffective, the U.S.
Congress in 1986 passed the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active La-
bor Act,' 78 which requires that hospitals (in order to be eligible for Medi-
care reimbursement) stabilize individuals who come to them with
emergency medical conditions.
The provision of health care as a response to suffering can also be seen
in the implementation of some of the state health care reform efforts. For
example, in 1987, Oregon chose to expand the number of participants in
172 See Chandler v. Hospital Auth., 548 So. 2d 1384, 1387 (Ala. 1989) (ruling that although a
hospital has no affirmative duty to treat patients in an emergency situation, once treatment has
been initiated, hospital must provide care); Citizens Hosp. Ass'n v. Schoulin, 262 So. 2d 303 (Ala.
Civ. App. 1972) (stating that a hospital has no duty to treat a patient it finds unacceptable).
173 The courts have imposed a duty of "necessary rescue" in cases where a person would be
left helpless without the help of the professional. Furrow, supra note 170, at 44. "The physician's
right to unilaterally terminate treatment is thus particularly circumscribed in emergency situa-
tions, defined as situations where the patient has a 'critical need' for that physician's attention. A
provider can be 'conscripted' to rescue through webs of obligation created by emergency situa-
tions." Id.; see Valdez v. Lyman-Roberts Hosp., Inc., 638 S.W.2d 111, 114 (Tex. App. 1982) (find-
ing that liability of a private hospital may be based upon the refusal of service to a patient in a
case of unmistakable medical emergency); Wilmington Gen. Hosp. v. Manlove, 174 A.2d 135, 140
(Del. 1961) (holding that hospitals maintaining emergency departments are required to admit
patients whose injury or illness is an "unmistakable emergency" if the patient has relied upon a
well-established custom of the hospital to render aid in such a case); Guerrero v. Copper Queen
Hosp., 537 P.2d 1329, 1331 (Ariz. 1975) (en banc) (ruling that the duty of a private hospital to
accept patients in an emergency arises from the state's licensing scheme); Wheeler v. Barker, 208
P.2d 68, 71 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1949) (finding a "duty to do what the occasion demands" in
emergency situations where it is not possible to obtain patient consent).
174 See Manlove v. Wilmington Gen. Hosp., 169 A.2d 18, 22 (Del. Super. Ct.) (stating that a
private hospital was a quasi-public entity because it was a recipient of tax exemptions, public
subsidies, and a corporate charter), affd on other grounds, 174 A.2d 135 (Del. 1961) (affirming the
order of the Superior Court but rejecting its reasoning).
175 See Wilmington Gen. Hasp., 174 A.2d at 140 (finding a duty to give treatment in an emer-
gency case arises under reliance theory); Stanturfv. Sipes, 447 S.W.2d 558, 562 (Mo. 1969) (find-
ing that a hospital was required to treat the plaintiff who, in an emergency situation, relied on
"the long established rule of the hospital to accept all persons for treatment upon the payment of
a $25 admittance fee"); Valdez, 638 S.W.2d at 114 n.1 (finding that hospital's liability may rest on
refusal to treat patient in unmistakable emergency if patient has relied upon hospital's custom to
provide care in such circumstances).
176 Guerrero, 537 P.2d at 1331 (interpreting state public policy to require general hospitals to
maintain emergency care facilities and finding that "such a hospital may not deny emergency
care to any patient without cause"); Thompson v. Sun City Community Hosp., Inc., 688 P.2d 605,
609-11 (Ariz. 1984) (affirming and expanding Guerrero).
177 See Karen H. Rothenberg, Who Cares?: The Evolution of the Legal Duty to Provide Emergency
Care, 26 Hous. L. REv. 21, 33-53 (1989).
178 By enacting the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act, Pub. L. No. 99-272,
100 Stat. 164 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (1994)), Congress sought to remedy
the growing problem of private hospitals' refusal to provide emergency care to indigent or unin-
sured patients. Erin A. Nealy, MedicalDecision-Makingfor Children: A Struggle forAutonomy, 49 SMU
L. REv. 133, 150 (1995) (citations omitted).
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its Medicaid plan by dropping coverage for organ transplants. 179 When a
seven-year-old died because he was unable to obtain a bone marrow trans-
plant through the Medicaid program, the public outcry in response to his
acute and visible suffering caused the Oregon legislature to restore Medi-
caid funding for organ transplants.'80
C. Conceptual Support for Rights Based in Suffering
In the collective conscience, we share not only a growing awareness of
the suffering, and especially the visible suffering, of others, but a growing
sense of responsibility to help others avoid avoidable suffering. We find
conceptual support for this heightened social responsibility in such theo-
ries as the feminist ethic of care. The ethic of care requires attending to
responsibilities and relationships, rather than attending to rights and fair-
ness (the ethic ofjustice). 181 Rather than learning and then applying ab-
stract principles, such as equality, reciprocity, and property rights that have
universal applicability (since all are grounded in an ethic of justice), an
individual or society acting under the ethic of care would seek responses
that are appropriate to the particular case.' 82
Much of the recent work on the ethic of care is an outgrowth of Carol
Gilligan's 1982 work, In a Different Voice, in which she presents her empiri-
cal findings that women and men tend to reason about moral problems
from different approaches.' 83 Women consider the world as "comprised of
179 W. John Thomas, The Oregon Medicaid Proposak Ethical Paralysis, Tragic Democracy and the
Fate ofa Utilitarian Health Care Program, 72 OR L. REv. 47, 54 (1993) (noting that the Oregon state
legislature determined that basic care for 5700 people could be provided by eliminating coverage
for the approximately thirty transplants performed each year).
180 Id. Following the death of Coby Howard, the Oregon Health Services Commission
(OHSC) proposed an alternative rationing scheme that prioritized the services to be offered to
Medicaid patients. Caitlin J. Halligan, Note, "Just What the Doctor Ordered": Oregon's Medicaid Ra-
tioning Process and Public Participation in Risk Regulation, 83 GEO. LJ. 2697, 2713-14 (1995). The
OHSC's ordering of medical services demonstrated a preference for life-saving treatments, and
services promising full recovery ranked higher than those that merely "improved quality of life
without a complete return to health." Id. The OHSC also ranked preventive service quite high
on the list. Id.
Seeking a waiver of Medicaid regulations, the OHSC submitted the final draft of the priori-
tization procedure to the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) for approval. Id. at
2716. The HHS denied the waiver, claiming that the ranking system's incorporation of the re-
sults of telephone "quality of life" surveys, used to assess public opinion as to preference of serv-
ices to be made available, discriminated against the disabled, because the public held
"'stereotypical assumptions about persons with disabilities.'" Id. The HHS also claimed that the
OHSC's prioritization of preventive measures over treatment of severe conditions further dis-
criminated against the disabled. Id.
Subsequent to the denial of its waiver request, Oregon negotiated revisions of the Medicaid
reforms, completely omitting the quality of life valuations. Id. at 2717. The HHS approved the
revised plan in March 1993, and the state implemented the plan in February 1994. Id.
181 WILL KmvsucKA, CoNTEmPoRAv PoucTC PHiLOsOPn. AN INTRODUCTION 265 (1990). See
generally NEL NODDINGS, CARING: A FEMININE APPROACH To ETHics & MORAL EDUCATON 2 (1984)
(caring is "rooted in receptivity, relatedness, and responsiveness").
182 KvMuCKA, supra note 181, at 265.
183 CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DFFRENr VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN'S DEVELOP-
MENT (1982). But see CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FENMNisM UNMODIFIED: DIsCOuRSEs ON LIFE AND
LAW 39 (1987) (arguing that Gilligan's theories are left-over remnants of oppression); Pamela S.
Karlan & Daniel R. Ortiz, In a Diffident Voice: Relational Feminism, Abortion Rights, and the Feminist
Legal Agenda, 87 Nw. U. L. REv. 858, 861 (1993) (arguing that the relational feminism view as-
serted by Gilligan and others, "fundamentally strains against many women's needs," particularly
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relationships rather than of people standing alone, a world that coheres
through human connection rather than through systems of rules.' 84 Gilli-
gan further writes:
The moral imperative that emerges repeatedly in interviews with women
is an injunction to care, a responsibility to discern and alleviate the "real
and recognizable trouble" of this world. For men the moral imperative
appears rather as an injunction to respect the rights of others and thus to
protect from interference the rights to life and self-fulfillment.185
Whether there are gender differences in moral reasoning or not, a matter
of much dispute, 86 the ethic of care that has grown out of Gilligan's and
others' work' 87 has received much attention on its own terms.'88
Attention to the particular circumstances of the case, the particular
case of suffering, and to the "real and recognizable trouble" that individu-
als face, seems acutely present in the case of physician-assisted suicide.
Timothy Quill has given a detailed narrative of his encounter with Diane to
whom he gave a prescription for barbiturates, with instructions for the
amount needed for a lethal dosage. 189 Not only has he told us about her
disease, its progression, and its predicted progression, but he has told us
about her earlier battles with alcoholism and depression, her need to be in
control of her death as well as her life, and the fact that she will suffer
in the realm of the abortion debate, where relational feminism and its "communitarian underpin-
nings and tendency to impose moral responsibility in situations of need make defending abortion
difficult").
184 GILIGAN, supra note 183, at 29. For example, Gilligan recounts an experiment designed
to measure moral development in adolescence by presenting participants with a conflict between
moral norms. Male and female children approached the resolution of the dilemma quite differ-
ently. In this experiment, the dilemma presented is whether a man, Heinz, should steal a drug
which he cannot afford, in order to save the life of his dying wife. The druggist refuses to lower
the price, yet Heinz's wife will die without the medication. An eleven-year-old boy responded
immediately and unequivocally that Heinz should steal the drug, analyzing the dilemma as one
between life and property, with life as the prevailing and logical choice. The boy set up the moral
dilemma as an equation, or math problem, and proceeded to a rationally derived solution that
rested on an assumption of "a societal consensus around moral values that allows one to know
and expect others to recognize what is 'the right thing to do.'" Id. at 25-26.
In contrast, the eleven-year-old girl responded with less certainty, and considered neither
property nor law in her answer. Rather, she was concerned with the effect that stealing would
have on the relationship between Heinz and his wife, reasoning that if Heinz stole the drug he
might end up in jail, forever precluded from helping his wife. Id. at 28. Thus, the girl viewed the
problem as "a narrative of relationships that extends over time," envisioning the continued inter-
dependence of Heinz and his wife, and contemplating the value of the wife's life in the context of
others around her. Id. Given that the girl's moral reasoning was based on the belief that, "'if
somebody has something that would keep somebody alive, then it's not right not to give it to
them,'" she was resolving the dilemma based upon the druggist's failure to respond, not upon his
assertion of his legal rights. Id.
The boy was confident that even a judge would agree that stealing is the correct thing for
Heinz to do, while the girl was confident that Heinz and the druggist could reach an agreement
through negotiation and compromise, thereby obviating the need to steal. "Both children thus
recognize the need for agreement but see it as mediated in different ways-he impersonally
through systems of logic and law, she personally through communication in relationship." Id. at
29.
185 Id. at 19.
186 See, e.g., MACKINNON, supra note 183, at 39.
187 See, e.g., NODDINGS, supra note 181.
188 See, e.g., Donald P. Judges, Taking Care Seriously: Relational Feminism, Sexual Difference, and
Abortion, 73 N.C. L. REv. 1323 (1995).
189 Quill, supra note 92.
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greatly if not given the means to control her death.'90 Similarly, in Compas-
sion in Dying, the Washington state litigation over physician-assisted suicide,
both the district and appellate courts give us accounts of the individual
suffering of the plaintiffs.' 91 In Bouvia v. Superior Court, where the court
permitted the withdrawal of Elizabeth Bouvia's feeding tube, her physical
and mental suffering is catalogued in detail.' 92
But in the latter two instances, we are not merely talking about an
individual physician, such as Dr. Quill, trying to make a judgment conso-
nant with his medical training and morality. While the courts in Compas-
sion in Dying and Bouvia lent compassionate ears to the individualized
suffering of the plaintiff, they were not concerned merely with the appro-
priate response a particular relationship of care would require; they were
concerned about universal fights.193 Yet rights are associated with the
"ethic ofjustice," not the ethic of care.
As we continue to move along the path of a collective conscience in
matters of health, the responsibility we feel for the care of others becomes
duty, and in the language of advocacy for recognition and adherence to
that duty, we see constant recourse to the familiar language of rights. To
give proper weight to a concern within our rights-based constitutional
framework, there is pressure to discover or proclaim (depending on your
natural law or positivist proclivities) a right. Thus, to ensure that we prop-
erly adhere to the collective duty we feel to alleviate individuals' suffering,
there is pressure to recognize an individual's right to claim the resources
needed for the alleviation of that suffering.
Rights to have one's suffering alleviated or avoided do seem to pull
from both the ethic of care (requiring a particularized response to an indi-
vidual's suffering) and the ethic of justice (expressing concern for others
by respecting rights-claims). But Gilligan claims that rights and the ethic of
justice are incompatible with the ethic of care. 194 Others, however, have
sought to explore where the two ethics merge or could be conjoined, 195
190 Id. at 692-93. Quill describes his initial response to her request: "Knowing of her desire
for independence and her decision to stay in control, I thought this request made perfect sense."
When he has given her the prescription and advice regarding how to use the barbiturates to kill
herself, he writes, "I wrote the prescription with an uneasy feeling about the boundaries I was
exploring--spiritual, legal, professional, and personal. Yet I also felt strongly that I was setting
her free to get the most out of the time she had left, and to maintain dignity and control on her
own terms until her death." Id. at 693. See generally Patricia Wesley, Dying Safely, 8 IssuEs IN L. &
MED. 467 (1993) (critiquing what she calls Quill's "seductive text" and arguing that Quill, accord-
ing to the account he himself provides, was not simply a self-effacing physician who respected his
patient's autonomy, but was a "powerful actor" in Diane's story, injecting his own values into her
medical decisions).
191 See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
192 See supra notes 118-27 and accompanying text.
193 Timothy Quill also used his published experience with Diane as a springboard for a propo-
sal legalizing physician-assisted suicide, though he does not in that proposal suggest that suffering
individuals have a right to physician aid in dying. Timothy E. Quill et al., Care of the Hopelessly Il
Proposed Clinical Citeriafor Physician-Assisted Suicide, 327 N. ENG. J. Mr. 1380 (1992).
194 Carol Gilligan, Remapping the Moral Domain: New Images of the Self in Relationship, in RECON-
STRUCTING INDIDUALISM: AUTONOMY, INDIVIDUALry, AND THE SELF IN WESTERN THOUGHT 237
(Thomas C. Heller et al. eds., 1986).
195 See, e.g., Elizabeth Ann Bartlett, Beyond Either/Or Justice and Care in the Ethics of Albert
Camus, in EXPLORATIONS IN FEMNIsT ETHICS 82 (Eve Browning Cole & Susan Coultrap-McQuin
eds., 1992) ("ethics of care and justice must work in conjunction to secure their mutual goals of
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some suggesting that rights provide a minimal level of acceptable behavior
when caring relationships are absent, 96 or that the ethic of care can in-
form the interpretation of rights. 19 7 But rights based in suffering do not
merely define minimal levels of behavior or reflect a "caring" interpreta-
tion of currently recognized rights; they create new, unprecedented expec-
tations of rescue-like behavior. How consistent are such rights-which
appear to be prompted by caring concerns for the suffering of others-
with the ethic of care?
With respect to the beginning of life and a prenatal diagnosis of disa-
bility, the ethic of care would appear to require a compassionate response
to the prospective parents' suffering, and sensitivity to the difficult choices
they must make; if the child is born, a similar caring and accepting re-
sponse would be expected, as all persons with disabilities are valued by the
ethic of care. The right not to be born does not suggest any such care.
Similarly, with respect to the terminally ill, the ethic of care would
appear to require, at a minimum, the provision of medical care to those
who are ill, and in particular, the provision of adequate, competent com-
fort care; in addition, the ethic of care would seek to provide such individu-
als with the company of those they love. Again, the right to die and the
right to physician-assisted suicide do not suggest such care.198
Rather, the right not to be born and the right to die, while borne out
of concerns of individual suffering, are, by their universal nature, absent of
individualized care. As I discuss in the next Section, the combination of
rights (ethic ofjustice) and concern about suffering (ethic of care) is po-
tentially destructive of our strongly held principles of equality and liberty
(or autonomy) and ultimately, of care as well. It is important then to ask
not only what social forces or new political or theoretical ideas prompt a
recognition of, or pressure to recognize, rights based in suffering, but also
to ask how recognition of such rights would fit within or challenge our
existing framework of rights.
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF RIGHTS BASED IN SUFFERING
If we let medical definitions of and responses to suffering prevail, and
give these the weight of law, we risk two grave results. First, we crowd out
other definitions and responses to suffering. Our law combined with
medicine will create the norms for behavior at the edges of life. Individu-
als acting singly, in families, or as communities will have less influence than
doctors in setting such norms. Second, we face a potential erosion of rights
the respect of human dignity"); Robin S. Dillon, Care and Respect, in EXPLORATIONS IN FEMINIsT
ETHICS, supra, at 69, 77 (advocating recognition of "care respect," which calls attention to both
the moral significance of common humanity and the particular, concrete individual).
196 See, e.g., Rita Manning, Just Caring, in EXPLORATIONS IN FEMINIST ETHICS, supra note 195, at
45; Judges, supra note 188, at 1382-88 (rights are "care's substitute in impersonal relations, and
reliance on rights evidences care's absence"; rights can protect individuals "when caring can no
longer be counted on to prevent harm and promote well-being").
197 Judges, supra note 188, at 1389-98.
198 But see Leslie Bender, A Feminist Analysis of Physician-Assisted Dying and Voluntary Active Eu-
thanasia, 59 TENN. L. REV. 519 (1992) (arguing that a care-based analysis can support physician
assistance in dying).
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we have traditionally held dear. We have now, through medicine, the tools
to evaluate the worth of an individual's life or continued life, and, through
law, the language of rights to support action taken on the basis of that
evaluation. But as we recognize an individual's right to relief from suffer-
ing, we risk an erosion of that individual's rights to liberty and equality, and
provide the language and the justification for taking a suffering individ-
ual's life for another's good.
A. Permitting Other Definitions of and Responses to Suffering
In a recently published essay, Leonard Harris considers the eunuchiza-
tion of George Washington Carver.199 He describes how the doctor who
made Carver a eunuch could have done so while believing he was respect-
ing Carver's autonomy, and in particular, his bodily integrity, his best inter-
ests, and his right to equal treatment. This is so, according to Harris,
because Carver's doctor would have been giving content to these concepts
by importing into them contemporary social ideas about the inferiority of
African-Americans and an understanding of the life that lay ahead of
Carver as an African-American. Castration was therapeutic because it
would allow Carver to hold a higher status than most slaves; he would be
perceived as less of a threat to white women and therefore would avoid
being lynched; as a house servant he would likely receive some educa-
tion.200 In Harris's account, in keeping with the doctrine of informed con-
sent, a component of our notion of autonomy, eleven-year-old Carver is
consulted. He appears ambivalent about the procedure, but does not ap-
pear to protest in the face of these reasonable assessments about the effi-
cacy of castration in improving his life prospects.201 The doctor castrating
George Washington Carver could do so in keeping with notions of auton-
omy and bodily integrity because, according to Harris, "the body is a so-
cially constructed and constituted subject entwined and configured by the
physician and the physician's social context."20 2
If autonomy, which is supposed to be value-neutra, can be so tainted in
its application by prejudicial and discriminatory social attitudes and condi-
tions, then how much more so shall rights based in the much more subjec-
tive and emotionally charged realm of suffering be subject to such skewed
application? By its very nature, suffering is laden with subjectively placed
content. If we adopt what I have called the medical model of suffering,
and import into our ethical and legal norms medical definitions of, toler-
ances for, and solutions to, suffering, then we give up other definitions,
tolerances, solutions. At first we may be deferring to physicians and the
medical community. After the norms have been imported, however, we
will feel comfortable declaring for ourselves when the suffering of individu-
als is occurring, is sufficient, and should not take place. Our language, our
options, our opportunities for other responses will have been limited to
199 Leonard Harris, Autonomy UnderDuress, inAFmcAN-AMumcAN PERSPECTIVES ON BIoMICAL
ETmics 133 (Harley E. Flack & Edmund D. Pellegrino eds., 1992).
200 Id. at 136.
201 Id. at 137.
202 Id. at 147.
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that with which we have grown familiar. The behavior of the mother of
Baby K, for example, becomes incomprehensible to us. Why did she insist
that her anencephalic daughter be resuscitated, like any other child in re-
spiratory distress? The medical evidence clearly indicated that her daugh-
ter had no life worth living.
Quality of life assessments abound in determinations of the presence
of suffering and its degree of severity. When we think about doctors or
courts making quality of life assessments in the context of decisions con-
cerning medical treatment, or the refusal of medical treatment, we gener-
ally think of them as focusing on the physical pain of the individual or the
diminished abilities of the individual. When assessments are made about
diminished abilities, this gives us pause: Is this another form of discrimina-
tion on the basis of disabilities? Advocates for persons with disabilities
would say the presence of disabilities does not equate to increased suffer-
ing of the individual. Marsha Saxton, while she recognizes that some per-
sons with disabilities do suffer, asserts that as a group, people with
disabilities do not suffer any more than any other group or category of
people.20 3 She further observes that the sufferingthat persons with disabil-
ities do experience is "primarily a result of not enough human caring, ac-
ceptance, and respect. '20 4 And the absence of human caring, acceptance,
and respect certainly seems apparent in the Bouvia case, where the woman
with quadriplegia who wanted the hospital to allow her to starve herself to
death had recently suffered a miscarriage, had her husband leave her, had
her parents tell her they could no longer take care of her, and had unsuc-
cessfully searched for housing adequate for her situation.20 5
Physicians look not only at diminished abilities, however, but even at
cosmetic differences as sources of suffering, and sometimes courts have
given credence to this view. Thus, in the name of the best interests of the
child, a New York family court has overridden the decision of a mother not
to force her son to undergo cosmetic surgery for neurofibromatosis, the
judge concluding that without corrective surgery, a "normal, happy exist-
ence" would "unquestionably be impossible.'206 Assessments about quality of
203 Marsha Saxton, Prenatal Screening and Discriminatory Attitudes About Disability, 13 WOMEN &
HEATi.T 217, 222 (1987). Saxton, a person with spina bifida and a former director of a center for
persons with disabilities, notes that
U]ust as the larger population, some of these individuals experience considerable diffi-
culty in their lives while others do fine, have jobs, and enjoy a full and satisfying life with
friends and family.... As a group, people with disabilities do not "suffer" any more than
any other group or category of humans. Our limitations may be more outwardly visible,
our need for help more apparent, but like anybody else, the "suffering" we may experi-
ence is primarily a result of not enough human caring, acceptance, and respect.
Id. at 221-22.
204 Id. at 222; see also HARLAN LANE, THE MASK OF BENEVOLENCE: DISABLING THE DEAF COMMU-
Nrrv (1992). Lane writes: "What is unforgivable [to hearing people] is that members of the deaf
community insist they are fine-for example, two-thirds of deaf adults interviewed in a 1988 sur-
vey thought their social life was better than hearing people's-when in fact we can give them a
thousand reasons why they can't be." Id. at 9. While deafness is considered a disability by hearing
people, and by the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12,101-12,213 (1994), many
members of the deaf community do not consider deafness a disability. Id.
205 Longmore, supra note 121.
206 In re Sampson, 317 N.Y.S.2d 641, 657 (N.Y. Fain. Ct. 1970), aft'd, 323 N.Y.S.2d 253 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1971), aff'd, 278 N.E.2d 918 (N.Y. 1972) (emphasis added) (quoted in JOSEPH GOLD-
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life when the cosmetic difference is minimal are more controversial and
less judicially sanctioned. But recently an abortion practitioner testified
before Congress that he had performed nine "partial birth" abortions-
controversial late term abortions in which the fetus is partially outside the
mother's body (usually its feet) when its skull is pierced, causing death-
"solely because [the fetuses had] cleft palates."20 7
These contemporary cases resemble Harris's narrative; is it then rea-
sonable to assume that someone will suffer or is suffering in part because of
her race or gender? The New York State Task Force convened to consider
the issue of assisted suicide concluded that:
No matter how carefully any guidelines are framed, assisted suicide and
euthanasia will be practiced through the prism of social inequality and
bias that characterizes the delivery of services in all segments of our soci-
ety, including health care. The practices will pose the greatest risks to
those who are poor, elderly, members of a minority group, or without
access to good medical care.208
One might point out that society had its ways long before the advent of
medical technology to end the suffering of children born with genetic im-
pairments or the aged whose ability to function was diminished as a result
of aging or disease. These individuals could be left behind or be the last
fed; in the extreme, infanticide and involuntary euthanasia have been prac-
STEIN ET AL., IN THE BEST INTEREST OF THE CHILD 165 (1986)). The judge declared the child
"neglected" in order to veto the mother's decision and require the facial surgery recommended
by the Commissioner of Health.
207 John Leo, Harder Hearts on Abortion, U.S. NEws & WoRLD REP., Nov. 20, 1995, at 42.
208 THE NEv YORK STATE TASK FORCE ON LIFE AND THE LAW, WHEN DEATH Is SOUGHT: As-
SISTED SUICIDE AND EUTHANASIA IN THE MEDICAL CONTEXT xii (1994). As of the spring of 1994, 12
of the 19 individuals whose suicidesJack Kevorkian had assisted were middle-aged women. Nancy
J. Osgood & Susan A. Eisenhander, Gender and Assisted and Acquscent Suicide: A Suicidologit's
Perspective 9 ISSUES IN L. & MED. 361 (1994). Osgood and Eisenhandler note that although there
are no accurate statistics on victims of assisted suicide available at this time, "[ilf the Kevorkian
cases accurately reflect the total of all assisted suicide cases, then it would appear that individuals
who die from assisted suicide are more likely to be older women." Id. at 362-63. This dispropor-
tional use of physician-assisted suicide by women may reflect our culture's tendency to devalue
older women. Boozang, supra note 77, at 32 n.34 (explaining that in our society, women are
considered to age more rapidly than men, causing them to experience not only the devaluation
associated with old age, but also "the additional loss of societal value and status connected with
women's loss of beauty and youth, as well as their sexuality and reproductive functions").
The disproportionate number of women committing physician-assisted suicide may also re-
flect physicians' attitudes about female dependency that cause physicians to make decisions for
their female patients. Id. (physicians doubt the ability of women to make rational decisions con-
cerning their own health care, choosing instead to "commandeer these decisions and execute
them from a biased perspective about their female patients' needs"). Physicians are also more
apt to dismiss women's complaints as emotional, resulting in inadequate care. Id. (citing Council
on Ethical andJudicial Affairs, American Medical Association, GenderDisparities in ClinicalDecision
Making, 266JAMA 559, 560 (1991)) (Although "[w]omen undergo more examinations, labora-
tory tests, and blood pressure checks, and receive more drug prescriptions and return appoint-
ments than men," women are generally denied access to major diagnostic or therapeutic
interventions such as dialysis, kidney transplants, and cardiac catheterization.).
See also Earl S. Ford & Richard S. Cooper, Implications of Race/Ethnicity for Health and Health
Care Use, 30 HEALTH SERVICES RES. 237, 244 (1995) (reasons for the disparity in medical care given
to African Americans are "likely to be multifactorial and complex," but it is possible that "subtle
or overt racism by the health care providers or the health care system" may contribute).
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ticed.20 9 Such practices might have been necessary for the survival of some
communities; for others, such as technologically advanced Nazi Ger-
many, 210 there is no plausible excuse. In neither case, however, would we
be entitled to claim that infanticide or euthanasia was the individual sub-
ject's right.
But we do seem to be willing to talk about rights to die or rights not to
be born when the individual asserting that right (or on whose behalf it is
being asserted), appears to have a reduced quality of life. And this, it ap-
pears, goes under the name of progress. Derek Humphrey writes in Final
Exit that " [t] he time is not far off when physician-assisted suicide in justifi-
able cases will be lawful in enlightened countries,"211 and calls proposals to
legalize physician-assisted suicide "reform."212 In a recent article of Barris-
ter, the magazine of the Young Lawyers' Division of the American Bar Asso-
ciation, an attorney working to legalize physician-assisted suicide was
209 The practice of leaving unwanted children exposed to the elements and, less commonly,
deliberately destroying them, has been present not only in more "primitive" societies, but also in
the history of the West, usually as a means of relieving the strain on family and community re-
sources. See generally William L. Langer, Infanticide, A Historical Survey, 1 J. OF PSYCHOHISTORY 353
(1974); Susan C. M. Scrimshaw, Infanticide in Human Populations: Societal and Individual Concerns,
in INFANTICIDE: COMPARATIVE AND EVOLUTIONARY PERSPECTrVES 439 (Glenn Hausfater & Sarah
Blaffer Hardy eds., 1984); see also Laila Williamson, Infanticide: An Anthropological Analysis, in IN-
FANTICIDE AND THE VALUE OF LIFE 61, 73 (Marvin Kohl ed., 1978).
In Greco-Roman civilization, the infanticide of children with disabilities was common be-
cause people believed such children were harbingers of the future, and that an undesired future
could be changed by killing the child. Kathryn L Moseley, The History of Infanticide in Western
Society, 1 ISSuES OF L. & MED. 345, 346 (1986). During the Middle Ages, newborns with disabilities
were suspected of being "changelings," or supernatural beings who were not the actua'children
of the parents. Id. at 352. Since the only way to force the "right" child to appear was to abuse the
"changeling" in some way, children with disabilities were often the victims of physical abuse and
infanticide. Id. at 353. Under these beliefs, the parents were without blame, because it was be-
lieved that the real child had been spirited away by fairies out of envy, leaving the parents as
innocent victims who had lost their "right" child. Id. The Christian version of the changeling
myth took the superstition one step further, claiming that the child was not taken by fairies, but
was "the demonical child of the devil himself." Id. Moseley asserts that "[i]fanticide of the handi-
capped newborn has been relatively common in Western society.... Ancient attitudes continue
to have an impact on our notions of the value of disabled newborns and continue to play a role in
their loss of life." Id. at 361.
210 Shortly after the start of World War II, Germany began performing euthanasia by gassing
handicapped infants, the elderly, and long-term psychiatric patients in order to make room in the
hospital wards for the war-wounded. Robert N. Proctor, Nazi Doctors, Racial Medicine, and Human
Experimentation, in THE NAZI DOCTORS AND THE NUREMBURG CODE 24 (GeorgeJ. Annas & Michael
A. Grodin eds., 1992). Proctor writes about the "banality" and "popularity" of the euthanasia
operation:
In 1941, for example, the psychiatric institution of Hadamar celebrated the cremation
of its ten-thousandth patient in a special ceremony, where everyone in attendance-
secretaries, nurses, and psychiatrists-received a bottle of beer for the occasion. The
operation was also popular outside the medical community. Parents were made to feel
shame and embarrassment at having to raise an abnormal or malformed child. Hospital
archives are full of letters from parents requesting their children be granted euthanasia.
Id. at 25. In proposing a "solution" to the "'Jewish Question,'" the Nazis decided upon euthanasia
by gas, since "the technical apparatus already existed for the destruction of the mentally ill." Id.
Thus, once the euthanasia operation of the mentally incompetent patients was complete, the
hospital gas chambers were dismantled and shipped to the concentration camps. Id. Proctor
notes that, "[i]n this sense, there was continuity in both theory and practice between the destruc-
tion of the lives not worth living in Germany's mental hospitals and the destruction of Germany's
ethnic and social minorities." Id.
211 HUMPHREY, supra note 91, at 18.
212 Id.
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heralded as one of twenty-one young lawyers "leading us into the twenty-
first century,"215 where an attorney working for the opposite camp, I ven-
ture to say, would not have been.
But, it may be argued, we are only talking here about a right not to be
born and a right to die, rights to have one's suffering alleviated or avoided
that can be exercised only by the individual claiming such right. No one is
forcing anyone to exercise these rights, and so concerns about rights based
in suffering are misplaced. This view, however, ignores the complex and
reciprocal interactions between legal and general culture. Our recognition
of rights and our language of rights establishes social norms of behavior.
For example, the right to speak may impose an ethical obligation to
speak-"You could have said something, why didn't you?" The right to
abortion and its reliance in part, at least in rhetoric, on the best interest of
the child (for example, the parents were not ready to provide a good home
for the child, an additional child would take the parents' time away from
other children, a child born with disabilities will suffer) may lead, may in-
deed have already led, to an ethical obligation to act in accordance with
those concerns-at times turning the right to abort into an ethical obliga-
tion to abort.214 So too with the right to die with dignity. Is recognition of
the right in public opinion and law establishing a norm that one should die
with dignity? Will dying characterized by senility or dementia, by drooling,
by groans of distress, by incapacity to care for oneself, be acceptable?21 5
Isn't what really bothers Timothy Quill's patient, Diane, the fact that she
will become dependent upon others-not that she will suffer physical
pain?216 If we tended to devote the time and emotional resources to care
for those who are sick and dying, and to learn to treat such individuals with
respect and not as a burden, would the suffering of some individuals who
claim that they wish to die (and who may in fact wish to die) be alleviated?
How much suffering, we must ask, could we alleviate with the prescription
suggested by Marsha Saxton with respect to persons with disabilities: more
"human caring, acceptance, and respect"?
If we let prevail the medical model of suffering, its definitions, risk
tolerances, and responses, we crowd out other responses to suffering, such
as more "human caring, acceptance and respect." There is a myriad of
other responses to suffering that may have merit-from individual re-
213 Gwen A. Baumann, 21 Leading Young Lauyers Different Yet Alike, BAmUSTER, Summer 1995,
at 8.
214 See supra notes 71-72 and accompanying text.
215 The Ninth Circuit's opinion in Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.Sd 790 (9th Cir.)
(en banc), cert. granted sub nom. Washington v. Glucksberg, 65 U.S.L.W. 3085 (U.S. Oct 1, 1996),
cites with some implicit approval the attitudes of many philosophers and writers concerning the
nobility of dying "at the right time." Id. at 807. For example, the court tells us that Hume be-
lieved "that a decision by a terminally ill patient to end his life was often laudable," id. at 808
(citations omitted); that Plato "suggested that if life itself became immoderate, then suicide be-
came a rational, justifiable act," id. at 807 (citations omitted); and that Montaigne wrote of Cato,
who killed himself to avoid dishonor, "[s]uch courage is above philosophy," id. at 807 (citations
omitted); see also supra note 90.
216 See Quill, supra note 92, at 693 (Quill emphasizes Diane's "desire for independence and
her decision to stay in control."). But seeWesley, supra note 190, at 469 (suggesting the possibility
that Diane's view that "she must be independent and in control, no matter what the cost," may
have impaired her "ability to fully assess all her options as she faced a life-threatening illness").
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sponses, such as spiritual or religious inspiration,21 7 and individual resolve,
a Viktor Frankl quest for deeper understanding from what one suffers,218
to societal responses, such as the provision of equal opportunities and ac-
cessibility for persons with disabilities, and research into cures for persons
suffering from diseases (not a priority when the births of such individuals
can simply be avoided).219 These other responses will not be necessary if
the problem of the suffering individual is always "fixed" with a medical so-
lution; a sanitized, clinical, professionally endorsed and executed solution:
at the edges of life, avoid the births of genetically different children by
prenatal diagnosis and abortion, and aid the elderly, the sick, and the se-
verely disabled toward death.
B. Erosion of Rights
While the alleviation of suffering has long guided many moral actions,
the duty to help others has remained for many centuries what Kant would
call an "imperfect duty. '220 Only "perfect duties" have corresponding
rights; for example, the perfect duty not to unjustly harm another means
that individuals have a right not to be unjustly harmed. 22' This perfect
duty resembles the rights to non-interference that we recognize under the
basic notion of liberty.2 22 We have rights to be free from the harms un-
justly imposed upon us by others, just as we are generally free in our ac-
tions so long as we do not unjustly harm others. But the duty to aid others,
being an imperfect duty, has not traditionally accorded one the right to
that aid.22 3 In the Anglo-American legal tradition, persons do not have a
legal duty to rescue another (and the person in distress does not have a
217 ARNOLD TOYNBEE, AN HISTrOIAN's APPROACH TO RELIGION 296 (1979) ("The practical test
of a religion, always and everywhere, is its success or failure in helping human souls to respond to
the challenge of Suffering and Sin.").
218 VIKTOR EMIL FRANKL, MAN'S SEARCH FOR MEANING (1963).
219 Martha A. Field, Killing "the Handicapped"--Before and After Birth, 16 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 79,
117-18 (1993).
220 JEFFRIE G. MURPHY, KANT: THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 51 (1970). Murphy writes:
A duty is imperfect if no one is in a position to demand by right that it be complied with.
I have, according to Kant, a duty to promote human happiness. This duty is imperfect,
however, because no one can demand by right that I make him happy, can regard him-
self as wronged if I fail to make him happy.
Id. An "imperfect duty," such as the duty of benevolence, is "not constantly and universally bind-
ing; that is, we are not obligated or duty-bound to help everyone all the time." John Arras &
Robert Hunt, Ethical Theory in the Medical Context, inJOHN ARRAS & N. RHODEN, BIOMEDICAL ETH-
ICS: A GUIDE TO DECISIONMAKING 16 (3d ed. 1989). This does not mean, however, that we are not
morally bound to exercise benevolence; rather, it means "that inclination can play a legitimate
role in determining whom to aid and when to aid them." Id.
221 MURPHY, supra note 220, at 51. It is never right to violate a perfect duty. Arras & Hunt,
supra note 220, at 16. Perfect duties to others are 'juridical duties" or "duties ofjustice" and the
.proper object of coercion by the State." MURPHY, supra note 220, at 51-52. "[P]erfect duties are
matched by perfect rights; specifically, the perfect duty to refrain from violating the liberty or
integrity of others is matched by a corresponding right to be free from such violation." Arras &
Hunt, supra note 220, at 16.
222 MURPHY, supra note 220, at 51-52.
223 "Because of [a] reluctance to countenance 'nonfeasance' as a basis of liability, the law has
persistently refused to impose on a stranger the moral obligation of common humanity to go to
the aid of another human being who is in danger, even if the other is in danger of losing his life."
W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THEI- LAW OF TORTS § 56, at 375 (5th ed. 1984);
see alsoJOEL FEINBERG, HARM TO OTHERS (1984).
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legal right to be rescued) unless they are in a special relationship that re-
quires such care.224
Thus, talk of rights and legal recognition of rights in our country has
been predominantly that of "negative" rights, or rights to non-interference.
Claims that people are entitled to certain goods, such as adequate housing
or food, that they have "positive rights" much like rights based in the idea
that one's suffering should be alleviated, have historically been rejected in
both our democratic processes and by our judiciary.225 Two overarching
principles are generally invoked to support recognition of particular rights,
whether from a constitutional226 or a philosophical perspective. 227 These
are the principles of liberty and equality. The right to abortion, for exam-
ple, has been justified under both of these approaches-i.e., women have a
right to abortion because they have a right to non-interference with their
body and their lives (the liberty argument)228 and women have a right to
the same opportunities as men, and cannot enjoy such opportunities with-
out the right to abortion and thus control over their reproductive selves
(the equality argument).229 Other rights that are normally seen as stem-
ming from concerns over freedom can also be justified under equality con-
cerns-thus, freedom of speech is not simply concerned about the
individual liberty of the speaker to express himself, but is also concerned
In contrast to the legal tradition, our country's majoritarian religious tradition, that of Chris-
tianity, calls upon people to help others, much more so than it calls upon people to respect
others' rights to be left alone or to be treated equally. The Good Samaritan story focuses not on
how the beaten traveler was wronged and treated unfairly by his robbers, but on how the Samari-
tan alleviated his suffering. As a call to duty, then, the Christian tradition has a longstanding
recognition of suffering. But while there may be a duty to aid another, there does not appear to
be a corresponding right held by the suffering individual of the end of that suffering, although
there may be special dispensation in heaven.
224 KEErON ET AL., supra note 223, at 376 (Carrier has a duty to take reasonable affirmative
steps to aid a passenger in peril; innkeeper has a duty to aid his guest; employer has a duty to an
employee who is injured in the course of his employment; host has a duty to aid his guest; shop-
keeper has a duty to aid his business visitor, jailor has a duty to aid his prisoner.).
225 In DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't ofSoc. Sews., 489 U.S. 189 (1989), the Supreme Court
held that a state child welfare agency bore no duty to rescue a four-year-old child who had been
beaten into mental retardation by his father, even though the state agents knew of the abusive
situation. The Court reasoned that: "[T]he Due Process Clauses generally confer no affirmative
right to governmental aid, even where such aid may be necessary to secure life, liberty, or prop-
erty interests of which the government itself may not deprive the individual." Id. at 196; see also
Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 317-18 (1980) (discussing the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment and finding that no obligation exists to fund abortions or other medical services);
Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 74 (1972) (discussing the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment and finding that no obligation exists to provide adequate housing); Youngberg v.
Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 317 (1982) ("As a general matter, a State is under no constitutional duty to
p rovide substantive services for those within its border.").
26 See U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1 (Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses); U.S. CONST.
amend. V (Due Process Clause).
227 For the idea that equality is the foundational principle for all rights and liberties, see
RONALD DwoRiuN, TAING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 272-74 (1978);John Rawls,Justice as Fairness, 67 PHIL.
REV. 164, 165-66 (1958). But see Mark Tushnet, An Essay on Rights, 62 TEx. L. REv. 1363 (1984)
(arguing that we lack a substantive theory of rights); Peter Westen, The Empty Idea ofEquality, 95
H v. L. REv. 537 (1982) (arguing that statements of equality collapse into more basic statements
of rights, rendering the concept of equality superfluous).
228 Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 869 (1992) (stating right to abort is based on a
liberty interest) (plurality opinion).
229 See id. at 927 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (stating that the assumption that women should
carry to term rests upon a conception of a woman's role that triggers the protection of the Equal
Protection Clause).
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about that individual's liberty to do so as compared to others-if only some
of us were allowed to speak, we would have a power, and thus an unequal
advantage over others.
But while some particular rights draw appeal from both equality and
liberty, the relationship between liberty and equality in many instances is
an uneasy one. Some specific rights appeal more to one of these qualities
than to the other, and rights often are in conflict in a particular situation.
The most obvious example is that the right to equality of goods or even
opportunities for livelihood may conflict with the rights of others in free-
dom from interference with their own goods acquired through legitimate
means, whether work (fruits of their labor) or inheritance (respecting the
freedom of persons to direct how their legitimately acquired goods are dis-
tributed upon death). This uneasy balancing 230 often involves the conflict-
ing rights of two individuals; for example, my freedom of speech may have
to be curtailed in the interest of your freedom of religion in a captive audi-
ence situation. We have no formula to balance the particular rights of per-
sons in conflict, nor to balance the underlying liberty and equality
concerns reflected in such particular rights.231
Legal recognition of rights based in liberty and equality entails duties
of non-interference and equal protection of the laws, respectively; in the
realm of medical ethics, rights based in liberty and equality parallel princi-
ples of autonomy and equal respect. If we are to recognize rights based in
suffering as we have long recognized rights based in liberty and equality,
then corresponding duties will follow. These duties are unlikely to be lim-.
ited to relieving self-identified suffering; that is, to relieve suffering when
the sufferer has identified the suffering he wishes to have alleviated.2 32 In-
stead, acknowledging rights to relief from suffering will entail the duty to
make quality of life judgments to determine the meaning or existence of
suffering and will require action upon such judgments at the expense of
liberty and equality.
The enjoyment of a right to relief from suffering (as in a right to physi-
cian-assisted suicide or a right not to be born) demands a direct, corre-
sponding duty on the part of others: one cannot exercise a right to
physician-assisted suicide unless someone or society makes a quality of life
judgment that "weighs" one type of suffering against that of another, to
determine if the suffering is severe enough to warrant granting the request.
If, as I have argued, the issue is not autonomy, but suffering, then the issue is
not how the suffering individual feels, but how we feel; whether we feel the
suffering merits relief through death, and we decide who can or cannot
die. Some courts have already recognized the inevitability of this sort of
230 A mild description according to Critical Legal Scholars. See, e.g., ROBERTO MANGABEIRA
UNGER, KNOWLEDGE & POLrrncs (1975).
281 In attempting to balance interests, these interests must be reduced "to some common
measure of value." Tushnet, supra note 227, at 1372. "The choice of the measure of value [to be
assigned to each interest] must be guided by some substantive theory of rights.... [yet] the
Supreme Court has not provided us with such a theory." Id. Rights are also, of course, "bal-
anced" against interests of the state as well.
232 Such a duty might be thought of as a duty to enable someone to exercise their autonomy,
the corresponding right being understood not simply as autonomy, but "enabled autonomy."
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assessment in wrongful life cases; that is, that judicial factfinders are faced
with determining whether a life with disabilities is worse than no life at all.
These are decisions I say are not ours to make. Recognizing rights
based in suffering requires that we (meaning those unconnected to the de-
cision: physicians, courts, society) make decisions about other people's suf-
fering, their quality of life and therefore their value in living. If we decide
that the suffering is severe and the quality of life substantially diminished,
then we are justified in treating this unequal life differently. We are justi-
fied in making decisions that erode autonomy and equality in the name of
providing required relief from suffering.
The potential (though improbable) application of wrongful life suits
against parents, and the more likely and already apparent economic, pro-
fessional, and social pressure on parents to abort "defective" fetuses, ac-
knowledge the right of children to avoid suffering. But they do so at the
cost of individual instances of parental autonomy and, as I have argued
elsewhere, as a general matter, they threaten the highly important relation-
ship of attachment between parent and child.23 3 Others have written elo-
quently about the deleterious effect such norms have on persons with
disabilities.234
When the individual seeks relief from suffering through the termina-
tion of life, rather than its avoidance, rights based in suffering carry the
same potential harms. The norm of a planned and painless, dignified
death, and the norm that only healthy lives are worth living, will place pres-
sure on persons who are terminally ill, elderly, or disabled, to seek medical
assistance towards death. In addition, even when the patient is competent
and alert, the well-documented power imbalance in the relationship be-
tween physician and patient23 5 will likely compromise that individual's au-
tonomy in making these decisions. In these ways, the individual's liberty/
autonomy interest in avoiding euthanasia and her interest in being treated
equally with those who do not suffer stand at risk.23 6 The problem, of
course, is worse in the case of individuals who are incompetent, as they
often are in these situations; the incompetent individual whose life of suf-
fering is to be ended does not in practice have much, or any, say in the
matter.
233 See generaly Shepherd, supra note 22 (proposing a right to familial attachment which
would allow parents to conceive and bear children with their given genetic identity).
234 See Hubbard, supra note 72, at 232, 234 (arguing that present day programs of prenatal
diagnosis mirror the eugenic practices of the Nazis, creating the belief that "disability is unmiti-
gated disaster, that we would be better off if people with disabilities did not exist," thereby perpet-
uating a "fear of difference" that is damaging to both disabled individuals and to society);
RoTHmAN, supra note 54, at 154 (explaining that perceiving a disabled child as "defective" exacer-
bates the experience of estrangement and "otherness" that all disabled people endure); Field,
supra note 219, at 117-24 (arguing against laws that encourage or sponsor the abortion of fetuses
on the basis of predicted disability because of the harm such legal rules have on the population of
persons who have disabilities).
235 See KArz, supra note 84.
236 See, e.g., Lee v. Oregon, 891 F. Supp. 1429 (D. Or. 1995) (holding that implementation of
a measure passed by the Oregon voters that authorized physician assisted suicide for terminally ill
patients would violate the Equal Protection Clause). See discussion supra at note 198. Measure
16 was also challenged on substantive due process grounds, which were discussed by the court at
the preliminary injunction stage, Lee v. Oregon, 869 F. Supp. 1491, 1497-99 (D. Or. 1994), but
which were not ultimately decided. Id. at 1437.
1996]
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
Looking ahead to the most stark consequences that may follow recog-
nition of rights based in suffering, I fear we may create situations where the
life of the suffering individual is balanced against the life of another who
may benefit from the termination of the life of the suffering individual. In
other words, we may create our own Sophie's Choice.
C. Sophie's Choice
Sophie is given the opportunity to save one of her children. Dis-
embarking at Auschwitz-Birkenau, she encounters the medical doctor
charged with selecting who among the truckload of prisoners shall live to
work in the camp, and who shall be sent directly to the gas chamber. It is
within the doctor's power to take the lives of both of her children; but
rather than take both lives, he asks her to choose one to save and one to
send to the gas chamber.23 7
She does not, however, have to make that choice. Prior to choosing
between her children, she has to decide whether to participate in the evil
game that the doctor has thrust upon her. Faced with two evils, the evil of
choosing Eva over Jan or the evil of choosing Jan over Eva, she could in-
stead choose not to participate in the evil.
The result is that both will die. One may well ask, isn't this an evil as
well? It is, but it is not an evil in which she participates-not an evil of her
creation. 238 She is asked to participate in the evil of another, and she could
choose not to. Indeed, if her duty as a parent is to love her children un-
conditionally, that is her only moral option. To choose between them
would be to act as though she loved one more than the other, such supe-
rior love conditioned upon some trait, perhaps unfathomable, and incapa-
ble of description or precise identification. To love one's children
unconditionally means to love them equally; otherwise, a parent has placed
conditions upon that love.
237 STYRON, supra note 1, at 483-84.
238 Alan Gewirth explains that all persons have an absolute "right not to be made the in-
tended victim of a homicidal project." Alan Gewirth, Are There Any Absolute Rights, in THEORIES
OF RIGHTS 91, 108 (Jeremy Waldron ed., 1984). In explaining this right, Gewirth defines the
word "project" to mean "a definite, deliberate design; hence, it excludes the kind of unforesee-
able immediate crisis where, for example, the unfortunate driver of a trolley whose brakes have
failed must choose between killing one person or five." Id. at 108. Gewirth provides the example
of a man who is required by terrorists to torture his mother to death; if he doesn't, the terrorists
will discharge nuclear weapons against a large city, causing millions of other people to die.
Under these circumstances, the son would not be justified in torturing to death his mother, and
in failing to murder his mother, he would not be morally responsible for the deaths of other
innocent persons who might be killed by the terrorists. Id. at 104. This is because of the "princi-
ple of intervening action." Id. at 104-05.
It follows from the principle of the intervening action that it is not the son but rather
the terrorists who are morally as well as causally responsible for the many deaths that do
or may ensue on his refusal to torture his mother to death. The important point is not
that he lets these persons die rather than kills them, or that he does not harm them but
only fails to help them, or that he intends their deaths only obliquely but not directly.
The point is rather that [it] is only through the intervening of lethal actions of the
terrorists that his refusal eventuates in the many deaths.
Id. at 104. While Gewirth uses the example of a mother-son relationship, he argues that the
individual asked to torture to death an innocent person would not be justified in doing so even if
there were no family relationship, as all innocent persons have "the (absolute] right not to be
made the intended victims of a homicidal project." Id. at 108 passim
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Does this mean that a parent must spend her resources, whether finan-
cial, emotional, or otherwise, equally between her children? No, and this is
an important point in the analysis which follows, where I will draw an anal-
ogy from Sophie's choice to future choices in medical ethics. Different
children, of course, have different needs and desires when it comes to a
parent's decisionmaking regarding resources; one child may need a private
education, a special tutor, another may need more individual attention
from the parent or may cause more worry.
But when it comes to questions of basic worth-whether one child's
life is worth more to a parent than another child's life-it is a savage be-
trayal of parental love, of parental duty, to choose one life over another.23 9
Indeed, the doctor in charge of selection realizes this fact at its most funda-
mental core; the narrator of Sophie's Choice explains: "[W] hat, in the pri-
vate misery of his heart, I think he most intensely lusted to do was to inflict
upon Sophie, or someone like her-some tender and perishable Chris-
tian-a totally unpardonable sin."24°
Again, however, can we then say that it is better that both shall lose
their lives? I say yes. If there are any principles that one might say in com-
mon fashion are worth dying for-and I submit there are, and I am cer-
tainly not alone in this-then the unconditional love of a parent for a child
would stand at the top of the list. As the decisionmaker in the family-and,
indeed, as the member of the family called upon to make this decision-
Sophie must speak for her family and its values. It means both will die. But
Eva, the one she chooses for the gas chamber, would not look back at her
mother, "beseeching."2 41
If she had not decided-not chosen-both would have died, but she
would have killed neither.2 42 In deciding against Eva, she participates in
the evil of her death. The point here is not to condemn Sophie, a victim
herself, who had no time to reflect on the meaning and consequences of
the action requested of her, even as such meaning and consequences
might directly affect (and indeed ultimately destroy) her. But, unlike So-
phie, we do have the leisure to reflect on her action, the leisure Sophie did
not have, and we must attempt to understand what we lose in making cer-
tain choices, choices that may appear thrust on us that we have the power
to refuse.
The illustration of Sophie's Choice is instructive for future decision-
making in medical ethics. Sophie gives up unconditional love to reduce
suffering; we want to give up autonomy and equality to reduce suffering.
239 Could Sophie have avoided committing this wrong by choosing by lots which child to save?
First, it should be noted that this option is not before Sophie in the novel; the point of the story is
that she is asked to make a conscious choice without the protection of a device of randomness.
But given that, even supposing a choice by lottery were available to her, she is still asked to
sacrifice one child to save the other, to use one as a means to the other. Her duties of parental
love do not permit her, evenly randomly, to use her children as instruments to other ends. See
ShirleyJackson, The Lottery, in THE SCAPEGOAT: RrruAL AN LIrRATuRE 238 (John B. Vickery &
J'nan M. Sellery eds., 1972) (creating a fictional account of an annual ritual whereby residents of
a village voluntarily draw lots to determine who shall be stoned to death).
240 STRON, supra note 1, at 484.
241 Id.
242 See supra note 238.
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Rather than the principle that a parent should love her children uncondi-
tionally, and thus equally, consider the principle that we should have equal
respect for all persons. This principle, attributed to Immanuel Kant, is
generally recognized in medical ethics as its most important tenet. As with
the question of whether a parent must allocate all resources equally be-
tween her children, 243 it does not mean that we have to consider all individ-
uals as having equal talents, or deserving the same rewards for their various
endeavors, or having the same urgency of need.24 It means at its most
basic level that we will not decide that one person's life is worth more than
another person's life and that we will not use individuals as means, but we
will respect them as ends in themselves.2 45
To defend adequately the principle of equal respect for all persons
would take us onto a different path of exploration. Thus, for purposes of
this Article, I take it as given that decisions made in the area of medical
ethics are governed generally by the principle that as a society we must
have equal respect for persons. Our Constitution, of course, guarantees
our citizens equal protection of the laws.2 46 While the desirability of an
ethic based instead on utilitarianism 247 is still debated, and cost-benefit
analyses of a utilitarian nature have a considerable lure in this field, as a
general matter, a deontological approach steeped in these Kantian notions
has prevailed.248 Thus, we impose strict requirements regarding the use of
humans as subjects of research.2 49 One family member cannot be required
to donate organs or tissue, such as bone marrow, to another family mem-
243 See supra paragraph following paragraph containing note 238.
244 For example, recipients of scarce donor organs are selected primarily on the basis of their
urgency of need and the probability of a successful transplant. Shepherd, supra note 85, at 809.
245 See generally Murphy, supra note 220, at 73-86 (explaining Kant's philosophy regarding the
principle that persons should be treated as ends in themselves, rather than as means). Kant
believed that our status as rational agents or persons gives rise to a right to self-determination,
that is, a right to determine our destinies, and that such a right should always be respected. Arras
& Hunt, supra note 220, at 18. The importance of this duty of respect is grounded in the "power-
ful and highly influential conception of the moral status of persons." Without this insistence that
we treat others as equal, we jeopardize our autonomy and become nothing more than "things,"
whose worth consists not in an innate integrity and dignity, but only in the uses to which they can
be put, utterly devoid of autonomy. Id. Recognition and preservation of equality and liberty are
critical to our status as rational beings; Kant demands that, for our own sake, we treat others as
moral equals, and holds that "the test of right action is that it can be universalized [or become a
perfect duty] without violating the recognized equality of all human beings." Id. at 15.
246 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
247 "[T]he utilitarian ethic directs us to elect among available alternatives the one that results
in the greatest net amount of happiness." Arras & Hunt, supra note 220, at 7-8. When faced with
a conflict between justice and utility, act utilitarianism holds that the act providing the most
utility should be favored. Rule utilitarianism, on the other hand, asks whether an act "conform[s]
to a rule the general practice of which would result in the greatest net amount of happiness." Id.
at 13.
248 The predominant objection to utilitarianism is that it would permit situations we would
generally consider wrong, such as slavery, because it violates our deeply felt notions about the
equal respect with which persons should be accorded. See MuRPHY, supra note 220, at 40 (stating
that Kant "was one of the first to raise what is now the classic objection to utilitarianism: that it is
incompatible with justice."). But see MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITs OF JUSTICE
(1982) (challenging the liberalism of Kant and the primacy ofjustice).
249 See Subpart A-Basic HHS Policy for Protection of Human Research Subjects, 45 C.F.R.
§§ 46.101-46.117 (1995).
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ber, even if it would save the latter's life.2 50 Incompetent individuals can
donate nonessential organs to their Siblings only if the donation is in the
best interest of the donor.251 Even once a person is dead, doctors are not
permitted to harvest cadaver organs without the decedent's earlier docu-
mented consent to a "gift" of the organs, or the consent of the decedent's
family.2 52 No individual can donate his or her essential organs while alive.
Or so it has been.
The Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs of the American Medical
Association [hereinafter Council] recently changed its position on the use
of anencephalic newborns as organ donors.2 53 While organ donation prac-
tices and the law in this country have long insisted that vital organs can
only be removed from a deceased individual, the Council expressed a will-
ingness to make an exception to the "dead donor" rule in the case of in-
fants with anencephaly, who are born with a functioning brain stem but no
other brain function.2 54 While such infants are believed to "never experi-
ence any degree of consciousness," 255 they are not considered dead. Cur-
rently, we determine that death has occurred if there is either an
irreversible cessation of circulatory and respiratory function or an irrevers-
ible cessation of all functions of the entire brain, including the brain
250 McFall v. Shimp, 10 Pa. D. & C.3d 90 (Allegheny County Ct. 1978) (refusing to order
individual to donate needed bone marrow to cousin). In this case, the court, while denouncing
the refusal of donation on moral grounds, dramatically defends the law's refusal to order such
donation:
For a society which respects the rights of one individual, to sink its teeth into the jugular
vein or neck of one of its members and suck from it sustenance for another member, is
revolting to our hard-wrought concepts ofjurisprudence. Forceable extraction of living
body tissue causes revulsion to the judicial mind. Such would raise the spectre of the
swastika and the Inquisition, reminiscent of the horrors this portends.
Id. at 92.
251 Kentucky's Court of Appeals affirmed a ruling authorizing the mother of an adult, incom-
petent son to direct the donation and transplant of this son's healthy kidney to her other, compe-
tent son, who had a fatal kidney disease. Strunk v. Strunk, 445 S.W.2d 145 (Ky. Ct. App. 1969).
While ostensibly relying on the doctrine of substituted judgment to authorize the operation, the
court's reasoning reveals its reliance on a best interests test. The court reasoned that it was in the
incompetent son's best interest to try and save the life of the competent son, in that the incompe-
tent son was "greatly dependent" upon- his brother, and "his well-being would be jeopardized
more severely by the loss of his brother than by the removal of a kidney." Id. at 146; see also
Lausier v. Pescinski, 226 N.W.2d 180, 181 (Wis. 1975) (denying authority for operation to remove
kidney from mentally ill brother for sister's benefit, the court found that "[t] here is absolutely no
evidence here that any interests of the ward will be served by the transplant"). Id. at 181.
252 UNn'. ANATOMICAL GrFr Aar (1987) 8A U.L.A. 19 (1993). There are exceptions for ca-
daver corneas in some states, where by statute if a body is under the authority of the medical
examiner's office, the corneas may be taken without the execution of a gift document by the
decedent or the consent of the decedent's family. See, e.g., Ky. RE.v. STAT. ANN. § 311.187 (Banks-
Baldwin 1994). Suits challenging the constitutionality of such statutes have had mixed results.
See Georgia Lions Eye Bank v. Lavant, 335 S.E.2d 127 (Ga. 1985) (holding that the family of a
deceased person has only a common law right not a constitutional right, to control the dece-
dent's body); Brotherton v. Cleveland, 923 F.2d 477 (6th Cir. 1991) (finding that a decedent's
wife had legitimate claim of entitlement in husband's body protected by the Due Process Clause;
state's interest in harvesting corneas not substantial enough to allow it to take corneas without
consent).
Also note that even if the family of the decedent wishes to donate the organs, the decedent's
earlier documented or known oral refusal to donate her organs will override the family's later
consent. UNIF. ANATOMICAL Grr Aar (1987) §§ 2(i), 3(b) (2), 8A U.LA. 34, 40-41 (1993).
253 Council Report, supra note 16.
254 Id.
255 Id. at 1615.
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stem.256  Neither of these descriptions fits the newborn with
anencephaly. 257 Such infants rarely live past several days,258 yet if surgeons
wait until the anencephalic infant is dead before removing her organs, the
quality of the organs is likely to have deteriorated beyond the point of use-
fulness for transplantation.259
The Council "temporarily suspended" its report following criticism
from members of the American Medical Association and some state medi-
cal associations. According to the Chair of the Council, the suspension
allows time for further research into questions about the consciousness of
anencephalic infants and the problem of diagnosing infants with
anencephaly. 260 The Council did not retract its essential position that in-
fants who are anencephalic as we now understand that condition can be
used as organ donors to benefit other ill children. If the Council's position
became law, it would then be possible for the parents of an anencephalic
newborn to donate her organs, and for physicians to take those organs,
even though she is still alive, even though she may be breathing on her own. The
Council's rationale for this position can be understood in terms of issues of
suffering: suffering as it relates to the parents of the infant with
anencephaly, to the infant in need of an organ transplant, and to the in-
fant with anencephaly.
The suffering of the parents of infants born with anencephaly is given
brief but prominent mention in the Council's Report. Permitting organ
donation from infants with anencephaly would "provid[e] psychological re-
lief for those parents who wish to give meaning to the short life of the
anencephalic neonate."261 The Council appears to have been motivated in
large part by the recent case of In re T.A.C.P.,262 in which the Florida
256 UNIF. DETERMINATION OF DEATH Aer, § 1, 12A U.LA. 593 (1996). The definition of death
under the common law was the irreversible cessation of respiratory and cardiac functions. Once
these functions could be artificially provided, a new standard for determining death was needed.
The Uniform Determination of Death Act, adopted in 32 jurisdictions by 1994, added the brain
death standard as an alternative to the traditional cardiac-related standard. Shepherd, supra note
85, at 779-81.
257 Seeln reTAC.P., 609 So. 2d 588 (Fla. 1992) (holding that an anencephalic newborn is not
considered "dead" for purposes of organ donation solely by reason of newborn's congenital de-
formity); see alsoln reBaby K, 16 F.3d 590 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 91 (1994) (holding that
a hospital may not refuse to provide emergency respiratory support to infant born with
anencephaly).
258 Council Report, supra note 16, at 1615. There is at least one case, however, when an
anencephalic infant lived two and a half years. This is the famous Baby K. In re Baby K, 16 F.3d
590 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 91 (1994); Marylou Tousignant & Bill Miller, Death of"BabyK"
Leaves a Legacy of Legal Precedents, WASH. PosT, Apr. 7, 1995, at B3.
259 This is the case with solid organ donation generally; the "brain dead" candidate is the
optimal candidate because with the assistance of artificial respiratory and cardiac function, the
organs of the individual donor remain oxygenated, and suitable for transplantation. Without
such artificial support, organs deteriorate rapidly.
260 Diane M. Gianelli, Ethics Council Reverses Stand on Anencephalic Organ Donors, Am. MED.
NEws, Dec. 25, 1995, at 3.
261 Council Report, supra note 16, at 1614. In one letter to the editor of the Journal of the
American Medical Association a doctor criticizes the Council's use of the term "neonate": "The very
language they use-'anencephalic neonates,' as opposed to 'the infant with anencephay' be-
speaks a degrading value judgment with which the mother of Baby K and, indeed, the mothers of
most such infants vehemently disagree." Michael P. McQuillen, Letter to the Editor, 274JAMA
1757, 1758 (1995).
262 609 So. 2d 588 (Fla. 1992).
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Supreme Court held that infants with anencephaly could not be used as
organ donors because they were not dead.268 In reference to that case, the
Chair of the Council later said, "They [referring to the parents in T.A. C.P.]
were, if you want to call it that, actually deprived of salvaging something
from this tragic experience ...."26 The Chair's use of the language of
deprivation suggests the presence of rights, rights based not on the auton-
omy of parents to make medical decisions for their children, but rights
based in the parents' needs to find relief from their own suffering.
The Council also justifies its decision on the basis of the suffering of
the many infants who could benefit from organ transplants.26 5 As com-
pared to the "suffering" of the infant with anencephay, who suffers from
an absence of any quality of life and a complete lack of dignity,266 these
infants' suffering can be alleviated through medical technology. Some of
them may be saved if anencephalic infants can be used as a source of or-
gans for transplantation.
The Council posits that the anencephalic infant cannot suffer or feel
pain when its life is taken.2 67 This, incidentally, is a point of some dispute,
which the temporary suspension of the Council Report acknowledges.
Nevertheless, if it is true that the infant with anencephaly feels no pain,
then, like the terminally ill patient who is aided in dying by a physician, the
infant with anencephaly will have a painless death when her vital organs
are removed. It is a clean death: clinical, painless, antiseptic. 268 Next, the
Council Report argues that such infants have no interests that must be pro-
tected because they have never and will never experience consciousness. 269
Because the "dead donor rule protects the fundamental interest in life of
persons from whom organs are taken,"270 and anencephalic infants have
no interest in life, then the dead donor rule should not preclude taking the
organs of such newborns with their parents' consent.2 71 The Council Re-
263 The Council's Report cites this case as an example of how parents are not permitted to
obtain psychological relief by donating the organs of their child. Council Report, supra note 16,
at 1614; see also AMA "Temporarily Suspends" Policy Regarding Procurement of Organs from
Anencephalics, TRANsPLANT NE~vs, Jan. 17, 1996, available in 1996 WL 844801 (Council Chair said
change in policy reflected concern about Florida case).
264 AMA "Temporarily Suspends" Policy Regarding Procurement of Organs from Anencephalics, supra
note 263.
265 According to the Council's Report, 30% to 50% of children under the age of two die while
waiting for transplants for hearts, livers, and kidneys. These figures are probably underestima-
tions of the true need for suitable donor organs because many children are never placed on
waiting lists. Council Report, supra note 16, at 1615.
266 See infra notes 267-75 and accompanying text.
267 Council Report, supra note 16, at 1615.
268 As are capital punishment executions performed by lethal injections. Some people protest
the use of lethal injections for executions because it "medicalizes" and "sanitizes" this barbaric
practice. Jack Cheevers, State-sanctioned Executions Become Numbingly Clinical TALLiASSEE DtMO-
CRAT, Jan. 21, 1996, at Al.
269 Council Report, supra note 16, at 1615.
270 Id
271 Id Some may argue that taking the organs of an infant with anencephaly does not violate
the principle that we shall not use one person as a means to another's end because such infants
are not persons. Although I do not have space here to provide adequate discussion of this issue,
several points do bear mention. First, the infant with anencephaly is the live product of human
reproduction,just like other infants; breathing on her own, she is certainly alive (persons who are
brain dead cannot breathe on their own; ventilators breathe for them). Second, our human
history of determining what or who is "less than human" (or only marginally a person) is almost
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port, therefore, talks in terms of the lack of interests of the infant rather than
the interests of the infant in being dead, the latter being more in line with
what I have been referring to as rights based in suffering. But the back-
drop to the Council Report is a developing culture that admits of such
interest-oriented justifications for taking life because of the increasing ac-
ceptability of both making assessments about quality of life2 72 and finding
the means within the medical profession's toolbag to relieve those who suf-
fer from an extremely poor quality of life. A life with "dignity," in the way
that term is so loosely understood and applied, is not possible for the infant
with anencephaly. Only through death can she achieve dignity.
The pending case of the parents of two-year-old Brianne Rideout illus-
trates the idea.273 Brianne, a terminally ill child with brain cancer, had
been placed on a ventilator and, as her disease progressed, became coma-
tose. Her physicians unilaterally removed Brianne from the ventilator over
the protests of her parents. The chief operating officer of the hospital de-
fended the hospital's actions by describing them as "the physician's effort
to continue to preserve the dignity of the child. '274
The Council Report also follows on the heels of the Baby K case, dis-
cussed earlier, in which the attending hospital sought a court order sup-
porting its refusal to resuscitate an anencephalic child; the hospital argued
that it did not have to treat Baby K as it would another patient who came
into the emergency room in respiratory distress; indeed, it was against the
physicians' ethical and moral judgment to provide such care.2 75
This is our Sophie's choice. As in the novel, one child might live if we
select the other to die. It is not entirely clear, and I do not really think it
matters, if our role more closely resembles that of the medical doctor in
Styron's novel, who creates the choice for Sophie, or that of Sophie, who
has the burden of choice thrust upon her. To the extent that Sophie is the
infinitely more sympathetic character, we may want to say that such
choices, like the choice between the anencephalic infant and the other
suffering newborn, are thrust upon us by nature. Under my analysis this
characterization does not absolve us; selecting one person to die for the
exclusively abhorrent, from our treatment of the mentally ill to the disabled to members of racial
minorities. Third, the slippery slope concern is ever present, i.e., that persons in persistent vege-
tative states will be the next organ donors, see Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S.
261, 350 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("there is no reasonable ground for believing that Nancy
Beth Cruzan has any personal interest in the perpetuation of what the State has decided is her
life"); see also ROBIN CooK, CoMA (1977). Fourth, courts faced with the issue of the treatment of
anencephalic infants have recognized them as persons, see In re Baby K, 16 F. 3d 590 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 91 (1994); In re TAC.P., 609 So. 2d 588 (Fla. 1992). Finally, and most
significantly for our purposes here, the Council did not consider such infants to be other than
persons. In response to criticism that the Council's proposal amounts to killing one patient to
save another, Dr. John Glasson, Chair of the Council, acknowledged, "It is." Ethics Outcry Over
Baby-Organ Donor Plan, Doomed Newborns are Transplant Targets, Amiz. REPUBLIC/PHOENIX GAZETE,
May 24, 1995, at AS, available in 1995 WL 2796236.
272 Thus, while the Council Report pays necessary deference to the notion that respect for life
is an "absolute value," regardless of a person's quality of life, it declares that such value is not
absolute as against other values, with which it must be balanced, the other value in this case being
the value of saving others' lives. Council Report, supra note 16, at 1616.
273 Frank Bruni, A Fight Over Baby's Dignity and Death, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 1996, at 6.
274 Id.
275 See supra note 153.
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benefit of another person violates our duty to treat individuals with equal
respect.27 6
The trade-off the Council makes is very clear. While in one breath it
says that life is an "absolute value" regardless of a person's quality of life, in
the next it says that such value is not, however, absolute as against the value
of saving other people's lives who have a much higher quality of life.27 7
Thus, the infant with anencephaly, who has such poor quality of life, as we
are able to perceive it, is sacrificed for the infant who can, with that needed
transplant, live a somewhat normal life. We are not talking about leaving
the infant with anencephaly out in the elements to die or refusing to feed
the anencephalic infant; those responses may seem cruel and barbaric. In-
stead, in the clinical sanctity of the hospital, under anesthesia and by the
skilled hand of an impeccably trained physician, the infant's organs will
merely be removed, incidentally causing her death.278 If Hannah Arendt is
right, that we have come in our social realm to be regarded as jobhold-
ers,2 7 9 then it appears as though the anencephalic infant's job is to be an
organ donor.
V. CONCLUSION
I believe that we have a moral duty to alleviate suffering and that physi-
cians and other health care workers should be commended in their efforts
to reduce suffering. We should continue research into more and better
ways to use medical technology to relieve suffering. Every American should
have access to medical care; our country's affluence requires that we carry
276 I acknowledge that value decisions are made (and must be made) in medicine. Some-
times, indeed, choices must be made among persons, such as deciding who will get a needed
transplant. These decisions may be difficult and troubling, but as long as they are made within
the framework of equal respect for persons, they seem to be decisions we can make and live with.
When the decisions are not made within the framework of equal respect for persons, and espe-
cially when they violate the maxim that we will not use one person as a means to another, they are
decisions we should refuse to make.
277 Council Report, supra note 16, at 1616; see GEORGE ORwELL, ANMAr. FARM 112 (Harcourt,
Brace & Co. 1946) ("There was nothing there now except a single Commandment. It ran: 'All
Animals Are Equal, But Some Animals Are More Equal Than Others'.").
278 Near the end of its report, the Council, anticipatorily defending against arguments of the
slippery slope-i.e., that taking the organs from still living infants with anencephaly will be
merely the first encroachment on the sanctity of the lives of other individuals living with impair-
ments-makes an incredibly powerful argument in support of such concerns. The Report states:
The problem with this argument, as with other slippery slope arguments, is that any
change in policy can be challenged on slippery slope grounds. When patients requested
permission to reject life-sustaining treatment, opponents argued that granting such per-
mission would open the way to euthanasia. Permitting the use of contraceptives, partic-
ularly those that work after fertilization, opens the way to abortion. It is not enough,
therefore, simply to invoke a slippery slope argument. Rather, it must be shown that the
slippery slope risk is a serious one in the particular issue under consideration.
Council Report, supra note 16, at 1616. No matter how one feels about the desirability of rights
to voluntary euthanasia or abortion, how can one seriously argue that the right to reject life-
sustaining treatment and the right to access to contraceptives, respectively, were not precursors to
the recognition of these rights? See Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 814-15 (9th
Cir.) (discussing Cruzan v. Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990)), cert. granted sub nom. Wash-
ington v. Glucksberg, 65 U.S.L.W. 8085 (U.S. Oct. 1, 1996); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152
(1978) (citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)).
279 ARENDT, supra note 155, at 31. Tim Schardi, who assisted me in my research for this arti-
cle, must be given credit for this insight.
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through on our responsibility to help others by providing access to basic
health services.
The question this Article presents is whether we should recognize indi-
vidual rights to relief from or avoidance of suffering. This is the principle
underlying the right not to be born and the right to die. We see its emer-
gence, I suggest, because of our gradual and unreflective adoption of a
medical model of suffering, our growing collective conscience, and our
rights-based jurisprudence.
I have chosen a stark and disturbing example of where we may be
headed if we give judicial recognition to the principle that an individual
who is suffering has a right to have that suffering avoided or alleviated,
even at the cost of life. Perhaps we could proceed into this future with
adequate safeguards to protect that individual's other rights based in prin-
ciples of equality and liberty. It seems unlikely, however, that the mere
existence of such countervailing rights that must also be protected,
weighed, and "balanced" against new rights based in suffering will be ade-
quate to protect all the interests of the individual. The developing medical
model of suffering that I have described is powerful. Adding rights to that
medical-technological formula threatens to overwhelm other rights that do
not have the same psychological and social force that medicalized suffering
does. What is needed is a new alternative model of responses to suffering
that includes, as a component of that model, medical solutions, but also
includes other responses to suffering and that elevates above medical per-
ceptions other, broader perspectives.
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